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Impact of EU's Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of Two Turkish Nationalist and Religious Peripheral Parties

Imdat Ozen

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IMPACT OF EU'S DECISIONS ON EURO-SKEPTICISM OF TWO TURKISH
NATIONALIST AND RELIGIOUS PERIPHERAL PARTIES

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by

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May, 2007

Abstract

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The study basically asked two important questions about Euro-skepticism and answered each question by testing four main hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on two different parties, the Nationalist Action Party and the Felicity Party, and on two different events (on December 17, 2004 and on October 03, 2005). Since the study had 4 general hypotheses, the total hypothesis testing occurred 16 times. To be able to prove the hypotheses, the content analysis technique was used on the data that was collected from

two newspapers: pro-MHP Ortadogu and pro-SP Milli Gazete. Each hypothesis was tested by using the two sample z-Test formula.

The findings show that the two decisions by the EU did not have any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. Only the first event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of both political parties and overall Euro-skepticism of the MHP. The findings showed that 3 of the testing had a negative impact and 13 of them had no impact at all. No positive impact was found at the 0.05 level. Only one of them, trust-based, showed significance at the 0.10 level. The results showed that the decisions of the European Union either did not change the Euro-skepticism or if there was a change it was in a negative way. By the end of the second event, trust-based Euro-skepticism of SP showed a decrease at the 0.10 level.

The results of this study were associated with the social identity theory, with a group's status as a peripheral party, and the policy requirements of the EU regarding Turkey's sensitive issues.

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The study basically asked two important questions about Euro-skepticism and answered each question by testing four main hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on two different parties, the Nationalist Action Party and the Felicity Party, and on two different events (on December 17, 2004 and on October 03, 2005). Since the study had 4 general hypotheses, the total hypothesis testing occurred 16 times. To be able to prove the hypotheses, the content analysis technique was used on the data that was collected from

two newspapers: pro-MHP Ortadogu and pro-SP Milli Gazete. Each hypothesis was tested by using the two sample z-Test formula.

The findings show that the two decisions by the EU did not have any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. Only the first event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of both political parties and overall Euro-skepticism of the MHP. The findings showed that 3 of the testing had a negative impact and 13 of them had no impact at all. No positive impact was found at the 0.05 level. Only one of them, trust-based, showed significance at the 0.10 level. The results showed that the decisions of the European Union either did not change the Euro-skepticism or if there was a change it was in a negative way. By the end of the second event, trust-based Euro-skepticism of SP showed a decrease at the 0.10 level.

The results of this study were associated with the social identity theory, with a group's status as a peripheral party, and the policy requirements of the EU regarding Turkey's sensitive issues.

CHAPTER 1

“After the membership it was immediately obvious that the difference between a Member State and a non-Member State was larger than we had imagined and that the EU looked different from the inside than from the outside” (Kuosmanen, 2001).

Introduction to the study:

Turkey’s prospective EU membership has captured significant attention and sparked a serious debate in Europe for several years. In spite of Turkey’s large Muslim population, geographic size, level of economic development, and low per capita income (Grigoriadis, 2006), its unique geo-strategic position (at the crossroads of the Balkans, the wider Middle East, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and beyond), and its importance for the security of Asia’s energy supply as well as its political, economic and military leverage (Laciner; Ozcan; Bal, 2005) have made Turkey a candidate country that is different from all the others.

Supporters and opponents of Turkey’s EU membership have used Turkey’s Islamic religious and cultural identity, geographical position, demographic size and level of economic development as arguments for and against Turkey’s EU membership.

For example, the supporters of Turkey's EU membership believe that the admission of a Muslim country into the EU would constitute the most effective guarantee of the EU's secular, inclusive, and multicultural character and provide a powerful example to the rest of the world (Grigoriadis, 2006). On the other hand, in the Declaration of the "No Turkish Membership in EU" Campaign, the opponents of Turkey's membership argue that Turkey belongs to the East and Islam, not Europe: "Turkey is not a European country. The Orient and the Islam are not part of Europe, and most Europeans don't want to have Turkish or Arab countries in European Union. Only European Countries should be part of European Union. EU is not a union of all democracies, nor only a Union of values, it's a European Union and Turkey is culturally and historically not European. Only the people of Europe have to decide which country is accepted as European country and member of EU, not politicians nor foreigners" (Campaign against Turkish membership in EU) <http://www.petitiononline.com/euro3/petition.html>. Some of those opponents believe that a "special relationship" between Turkey and the EU would be desirable for strategic and economic reasons (Schauble, 2004). "Special relationship" can also be defined as a "Privileged partnership", a closer strategic, political and economic relationship, but not a full membership. This idea became very popular, especially with some opponent political parties in Germany, Australia and France. Hidden European fears, prejudices and skepticism always come to the surface when the discussion is about Turkey's full EU membership (Grigoriadis, 2006). This European rejectionism targeting Turkey can be observed among both elites as well as the common people of Europe (Yilmaz, 2004). After taking a glimpse at the European

perception of Turkey's prospective EU membership, it would be relevant to look at the perception of Turkey about its own membership in the EU.

Turkish public opinion is overwhelmingly on the side of the Europhiles (supporters) and enthusiasm among dominant groups is increasing. According to the Euro-barometer, Turkey is one of the higher-ranking countries in support of EU membership with 65 percent in favor of the proposal (European Commission, 2002). 71 percent of this sample thinks that the country will benefit from such membership. There are many different studies that measure the attitudes of the Turkish public toward Turkey's EU membership; these studies will be explained in the literature review portion of this dissertation. According to some of these descriptive studies, the Turkish public, as well as the majority of Turkish political parties and elites are in favor of Turkey's EU membership. The Euro-skeptic elites and parties are limited in numbers and have limited appeal to the Turkish public, but the ambivalent position of Europe and its Turkey-skepticism helps them to harden (Ayata, 2003). On the contrary, there is a lack of empirical research about the perceptions of Turkish political elites toward the European Union.

Therefore, conducting an empirical study on the "Euro-skepticism of some nationalist and religious peripheral Turkish political parties" makes my research valuable, and will lessen the deficit observed in empirical research in this field. This dissertation will measure the impact of 17 December 2004 and 3 October 2005 on trust-based and ideology-based (religion and nationalism) euro-skepticism in specific and Euro-skepticism in general.

There have been some studies on the party preferences of the individuals and how they relate to support of or opposition to EU membership. Based on previous research, among all major political parties, only the Pro-Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) has a majority of voters against full membership of Turkey in the EU. SP's major pro-Islamist contender, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) has a small majority (52 percent) in favor of full EU membership. All other parties have a clear majority of voters in favor of the EU membership of Turkey. It is interesting that the highest level of EU support came from the constituents of Kurdish HADEP, which was banned in 2003. Despite much open opposition by the party elite, 68 percent of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) supporters are also in clear support of the EU membership (Carkoglu, 2003). The main reason for this opposition by the party elite is Euro-skepticism. The roots of Euro-skepticism are distrust towards the EU, nationalism, and religion-based concerns in Turkey. That is why MHP and SP show a clearer skepticism toward the EU compared to other political parties. The fear that European integration could erode national sovereignty and dilute Turkish-Islamic identity and culture possibly forms these two parties' skepticism toward EU integration (Arikan, 2004). By looking at the results of the research above, we can see that there is not a clear correlation between party preference and support of or opposition to EU integration in some cases, and there is in some others. As seen, even though MHP leadership has shown a strong resistance to EU integration, 68 percent of its constituents have supported Turkey's EU membership. On the other hand, AKP is the leader of the EU integration process of Turkey but only

52 percent of its constituents have supported full EU membership of Turkey. This correlation is clearer in the case of other parties. For instance, SP shows a strong resistance against the EU and the majority of its constituents show resistance also.

According to the general idea of the research above, even though there are some exceptions such as MHP and its followers, the relationship between the party preferences of the individuals and their support/resistance of Turkey's EU membership still exists. The importance of this relationship is the answer to the question, "Why is the resistance/support of the EU by the parties important to Turkey's EU membership?"

Each party has a certain number of supporters. The way the political party thinks can easily affect these followers. Subsequently, these parties may have an important role in affecting society's opinion about the Integration of Turkey in the EU. For that reason, the resistance of the party is important enough to be diagnosed. Then it can be helpful for the government to integrate in EU. For example, from a policy perspective, there exist many so-called "sensitive" issues that can easily be used by the political parties which are in opposition to Turkey's EU membership. These issues are more likely to be publicly expressed and thus easily exploited, within a Euro-skeptic, nationalistic, and religious rhetoric to make them more acceptable to the largely EU-supportive Turkish public. The choice of the rhetoric of political parties may significantly change the level of support or opposition of the public for the full membership of Turkey in the EU. In view of that, despite the majority of public support for Turkey's EU membership, the polarized elite resistance to membership finds ample opportunities to manipulate the public agenda. "Segments within the political elite can

easily accomplish their objective of melting mass support for EU membership by providing misinformation to the public and strategically shaping the rhetoric around the sensitive issues” (Carkoglu, 2003). One such example of a “sensitive issue” involves the cultural rights of the citizens of Kurdish origin and the abolition of the death penalty. The death penalty is linked to the Kurdish issue due to the fact that Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, was on death row.

Therefore, in this study the relationship will be looked at from the perspective of political parties and their relationship with support/opposition of Turkey’s EU membership. There have been studies on the party preferences of constituencies and support/opposition for EU membership. The perspective in this study is from the political parties’ standpoint rather than that of party constituencies. Thus, this study will explore whether or not political parties’ opinions cause them to resist Turkey’s EU membership and if so, how. The main reason that some political parties resist EU integration is because of the various forms of Euro-skepticism that they harbor. There are different reasons for Euro-skepticism, and this study will attempt to explain all these reasons and measure whether the decisions of the EU towards Turkey’s EU membership have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites?” December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 will be used as two major events to measure the impact of the decisions of the EU toward Turkey’s EU membership.

Significance of the Study:

The issue of Euro-skepticism has recently attracted intense academic interest in member and, especially, in candidate countries of the European Union. Although there has been some research that measured Euro-skepticism at the community (constituencies) level in Turkey, there is still a lack of research at the party level. This study's significance lies partially in its contribution to the research on Euro-skepticism at the political party level in Turkey.

The importance of this topic also comes from searching and investigating the reasons behind the Euro-skepticism of some radical Turkish political parties. In general, religion, nationalism and mistrust towards the EU are the main reasons that make these radical parties Euro-skeptical. While employing a content analysis, we will see a more detailed picture of the reasons for the Euro-skepticism of these particular parties other than the three general reasons.

Further significance of this study lies in conducting empirical research about Turkey's European Union (EU) membership. This dissertation will investigate whether the decisions of the EU towards Turkey's EU membership have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites. December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 will be used as two major events to measure the impact of the decisions of the EU toward Turkey's EU membership.

Even though SP and MHP are considered anti-EU parties, I believe that their religiosity and nationalistic principles are not the only factors that affect their attitudes about the EU. I strongly believe that besides religion and nationalism, distrust towards

the EU is another important factor that affects their attitudes about EU membership. When Euro-skepticism increases, their resistance about integration into the EU increases too. On the other hand when the Euro-skepticism decreases, the support increases towards the EU. These two major events, December 17, 2004 and October 03, 2005, may have a correlation with Euro-skepticism. By looking at each party's statements before, during, and after these two events, I will determine whether these two events have any impact on their EU -skepticism, and thus, their support of and resistance to EU integration. If the anti-EU statements decrease, it is more likely to say that the support will increase. If the anti-EU statements increase, the resistance or opposition against the EU will increase. Euro-skepticism can be divided into three categories: trust, nationalism, and religion. Because of the close relationship between nationalism, religion and trust toward the EU, each category should be carefully defined, and the analysis of each statement should be categorized appropriately. Trust-based statements will be put under trust, nationalistic statements will be put under nationalism, and religious statements will be put under religion. By doing that, one can measure the impact of the decisions of the EU on Euro-skepticism in general, and on trust, nationalism and religion-based Euro-skepticism in specific. Trust-based Euro-skepticism can at best be characterized by distrust, doubt and hesitation. Nationalism-based Euro-skepticism can be characterized as the fear that European integration could erode national values and sovereignty, and finally Religion-based Euro-skepticism can be characterized as the fear that European integration could dilute Islamic identity and culture. In other words, this dissertation is going to investigate the impact of the two

major events on trust-based Euro-skepticism (distrust, doubt and hesitation) and on ideology-based Euro-skepticism (nationalism and religion). These two events may affect trust more than they affect the ideology since the ideologies are not easy to change. This dissertation is going to determine the answer for that while it measures the impact of these two major events on Euro-skepticism in general. Measuring the impact of the two major events on the trust-based and ideology-based Euro-skepticism is another important aspect of my research.

Conducting this research on the peripheral parties is another contribution of this study. This way, an opportunity is created to compare and contrast the findings with a similar study that was conducted on the core parties and to show how these radical parties respond to the EU membership project of Turkey when they were considered core parties versus now that they have become peripheral (Arikan, 2004). This comparison will be especially valid for the case of MHP, since it is the common party in our studies.

Even though the two parties, MHP and SP, did not have any seat in the parliament in the last election we cannot infer that these parties will not have enough power in the political arena in years to come. Because of the inconsistent situation of each election in Turkey, none of the parties' impact should be ignored. Their power should not be judged based only on the last election. (The last two general Turkish elections for the parliament are demonstrated in Table 1 and Table 2 to clarify this situation and also to show the parties that passed and did not pass the 10% threshold).

Table 1: 18 April 1999 Election Results(*)

	Votes Cast	Percent of Vote (%)	Number of MPs	Percent of Seats in Parliament (%)
Democratic Left Party (**) (DSP)	6,919,670	22.19	136	24.72
National Action Party (MHP)	5,606,583	17.98	129	23.45
Virtue Party (FP)	4,805,381	15.41	111	20.18
Motherland Party (ANAP)	4,122,929	13.22	86	15.64
True Path Party (DYP)	3,745,417	12.01	85	15.46
Republican People's Party (***) (CHP)	2,716,094	8.71	--	--
People's Democracy Party (HADEP)	1,482,196	4.75	--	--
Grand Unity Party (BBP)	456,353	1.46	--	--
Independents	270,265	0.87	3	0.55
Freedom and Democracy	248,553	0.8	--	--
Democratic Turkey Party	179,871	0.58	--	--
Liberal Democracy Party	127,174	0.41	--	--
Democrat Party	92,093	0.3	--	--
Unity Party	78,922	0.25	--	--
Nation Party	79,370	0.25	--	--
Labor Party	57,607	0.18	--	--
Toil Party	51,756	0.17	--	--
Rebirth Party	44,787	0.14	--	--
Changing Turkey Party	37,376	0.12	--	-
Socialist Power	37,680	0.12	--	--
Democratic Peace Party	24,419	0.08	--	--
Total	31,184,496	100	550	100

(*) Votes cast at the border crossing are included in the figures,

(**) Parties reaching threshold,

(***) Parties not reaching threshold)

DSP, MHP, and ANAP established the coalition and they became ruling parties.

DYP and FP are the opposition parties (Makovsky, 1999).

<http://meria.biu.ac.il/research-g/turkey-elections.html>

MHP (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) is one of the parties that will be included in this

study. It is referred to as National Action Party, Nationalist Movement Party, or

Nationalist Action Party.

FP (Fazilet Partisi), Virtue Party, was a political party in Turkey and was found unconstitutional by Constitutional Court and banned in 2001. Then the founders of

Virtue party founded the SP (Saadet Partisi), Felicity party, which is the second party that will be studied in this dissertation.

Table 2:**Parliamentary General Elections: 3 November 2002**

Parliamentary General Elections: 3 November 2002 (78.9 %)		%	seats 550
Justice and Development Party (AKP), moderate Islamic	AKP	34.3	363
Republican People's Party (CHP), social-democratic	CHP	19.4	178
True Path Party (DYP), centre-right liberal	DYP	9.6	-
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) , far-right, nationalist	MHP	8.3	-
Youth Party (GP), populist	GP	7.2	-
Alliance based on the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), and the Kurdish People's Democratic Party (DEHAP)	SHP	6.2	-
Motherland Party (ANAP), center-right liberal	ANAP	5.1	-
Felicity Party (SP) , conservative, Islamic	SP	2.5	-
Democratic Left Party, centre-left	DSP	1.2	-
New Turkey Party, liberal social democrats	YTP	1.0	-
Grand Unity Party	BBP	1.1	-
Non-partisans		.	9

(Jansen, 2005)

<http://www.europeanforum.net/country/turkey>

AKP is the ruling party. CHP is the main parliamentary opposition party.

It is required to have 276 MPs to be a single ruling party. It is also required to have 367

MPs to change the Constitution without referendum (with the approval from the

President). **MHP (Nationalist Action Party)** and **SP (Felicity Party)** are the two

peripheral parties that will be studied in this dissertation. Felicity Party was founded on 20 July 2001 by the members of the FP, Virtue Party.

Also, the peripheral position of SP and MHP explains why these two parties were chosen to measure the impact of these two major events on their Euro-skepticism. Core political parties with a role in governance seldom embrace Euro-skeptic positions. First of all, such parties are, in effect, charged with bringing their countries in compliance with the *acquis*, and cannot undermine the prevailing consensus on the “return to Europe.” Furthermore, parties in power are responsible for the continuation and implementation of the reform package that involves unpopular social and economic policies, so that the conditionality associated with accession has an instrumental value as justification for the reform. (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2002).

On the other hand, parties in opposition, appear to have more incentives to articulate Euro-skeptic views as a means to differentiate the political space and make inroads in the competition for power (Bielasiak, 2004). Eventually, the anti-European position is most frequently advanced by peripheral parties. Therefore, comparing these three types of political parties discussed earlier, it shows that the level of euro-skepticism gradually increases going from ruling parties (lowest level) to opposition parties to peripheral parties (highest level). (Ruling and opposition parties are in the Parliament; peripheral parties are not in the Parliament.) The following table which shows the characteristics of the Euro-skeptical parties is the proof of this rank.

Therefore, essentially the evident in the prevalence of extra parliamentary parties in the

Euro-skeptic policy space confirms that the anti-European position is most frequently advanced by peripheral parties (extra parliamentary parties).

Table 3. Characteristics of Eurosceptic Parties at Last Elections

	Percent Vote	Party Family	Ideol. Position	System Position	Former Coalition	Year Founded
<u>CZECH REP. (2002)</u>						
Civic Demo. Party (ODS)	24.5	Lib/cons.	R	Opp.	Yes	1991
Comm. Party (KSCM)	18.5	Comm.	L	Opp.	No	1990
Republicans (RMS)	1.0	National.	R	Extra	No	[1990]
<u>ESTONIA (2003)</u>						
Centre Party (Kesk)	25.4	Lib/populist	R	Opp.	Yes	1991
Christian People's P. (EKRP)	1.1	Ch-D nation	R	Extra	No	1999
Independence P. (Iseseiv)	0.5	National.	R	Extra	No	
<u>HUNGARY (2002)</u>						
Justice and Life P. (MIEP)	4.4	National.	R	Extra	No	1993
Workers' Party (MP)	2.2	Comm.	L	Extra	No	1990
Independent Smallholders (FGKP)	0.8	Agrarian	R	Extra	Yes	1989
<u>LATVIA (2002)</u>						
Green & Farmers Union (ZZS)	9.5	Env/Agr		Govt.	na	1990/1993
Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK)	5.4	Nat-conser.	R	Govt.	na	pre-1993
Soc-Demo Workers' P. (LSSP)	4.0	Soc-demo.	L	Extra	No	1989
Soc-Demo Welfare P. (SDLP)	1.3	Socialist	L	Extra	No	pre-2002
<u>LITHUANIA (2000)</u>						
Lith. Peasants' Party (LVP)	4.1	Agrarian	R	Extra	No	1990
Centre Union (LCS)	2.9	Liberal	R	Extra	Yes	1993
<u>POLAND (2001)</u>						
Self-Defense (SO)	10.2	Agr-populist	R	Opp.	No	1992
Law and Justice (PiS)	9.5	Conserv.	R	Opp.	No	2001
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	9.0	Agrarian	L	Govt.*	Yes	1990
League of Polish Families (LPR)	7.9	Christ.conser.	R	Opp.	No	2001
Solidarity Elect Action Right (AWSP)	5.6	Conserv.	R	Extra	(as AWS)	[1996]
<u>ROMANIA (2000)</u>						
Greater Romania Party (PRM)	19.5	Nat-populist	R	Opp.	No	1991
<u>SLOVAKIA (2002)</u>						
Mov. For Demo. Slovakia (HZDS)	19.5	Nat-populist	R	Opp.	Yes	1992
Christ-Democratic Mov. (KDH)	8.3	Christ-demo.	R	Govt.	na	1990
Communist Party (KSS)	6.3	Comm.	L	Opp.	No	1994
Real Slovak National P. (PSNS)	3.7	National.	R	Extra	No	2001
Slovak National Party (SNS)	3.3	National.	R	Extra	Yes	1990
<u>SLOVENIA (2000)</u>						
Slovenian National Party (SNS)	4.4	National.	R	Opp.	No	1991

*to 3.2003

Resource; (Bielasiak, 2004).

Purpose of the Study:

This study tries to achieve the following objectives:

- Searching and investigating the factors behind Euro-skepticism in specific detail,
- Measuring the impact of the decisions of the EU on Euro-skepticism for two major Euro-skeptical parties in general,
- Measuring the impact of the decisions of the EU on trust-based Euro-skepticism, (distrust, doubt and hesitation) and ideology-based Euro-skepticism (nationalism and religion) in specific (Ideology based-euro-skepticism vs. Trust based-euro-skepticism).
- Contributing to the increase of research about support and resistance for EU membership of Turkey at the political party level.

There is a change in Turkey because of the EU membership process and this change is being either accepted or resisted in different ways by Turkish citizens, constituencies and different parties. Although there has been some research that measures the support and resistance for EU membership of Turkey at the community and constituency level, there has been lack of research at the political party level.

Concise Background Information:

Even though the detailed background information about Euro-skepticism will be given under the literature review portion in the second chapter, it is prudent to provide a brief explanation on how it started in Turkey and what it means for some political elites

and for society. To understand the EU resistance better, one needs to understand the Turkish perceptions of Europe and the European Union, both at the elite as well as the popular level. These perceptions move back and forth between a general willingness to be like Europe and to join the European Union, which is called Europhilia, and the accompanying feelings of suspicion and mistrust towards Europe and the European Union, which is called Euro-skepticism.

Although there are groups within the Turkish public who are distinctively more Europhile than Euro-skeptic, or vice versa, more often than not these seemingly contradictory sets of beliefs are manifested by the same individuals. Various research projects on the issue of the Turkish perceptions of Europe showed that the attitudes of the majority of people can at best be characterized by ambiguity, ambivalence, confusion, double-mindedness, uncertainty, and cynicism (Yilmaz, 2004). A Turkish joke about the European Union's true intentions towards Turkey may better illustrate this prevalent cynical attitude. The joke goes like this: The European Union finally decides that the last remaining candidate states, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, have waited too long and that it is time to allow them to enter. However, the European Union, being obsessed with conditions and criteria for entry into the Union, still insists that they fulfill one condition. This last condition is that Gunther Verheugen will call in the foreign ministers of the three countries for a meeting and he will ask each minister one question. If the minister knows the correct answer to Verheugen's question, then this country will be made a member immediately; if not his country will continue waiting for an indefinite period of time. Verheugen issues invitations to the three

foreign ministers, and they all meet in Brussels. The first question is directed to the Bulgarian foreign minister. “Tell me Mr. Minister”, says Verheugen, “in which year the Americans first used the atom bomb?” The Bulgarian foreign minister, without hesitating, says “1945”. Bulgaria is then accepted, and Romania takes a turn. “Mr. Foreign minister”, says Verheugen, “could you tell me which Japanese city was first attacked by the Americans with the atom bomb?” The Romanian minister, after a moment’s hesitation, says “Hiroshima”. “Bravo”, says Verheugen, “you are in too”. Finally, it is Turkey’s turn. Verheugen turns to the Turkish foreign minister and says, “my dear Turkish colleague, here is your question: could you tell me exactly how many people died in the American nuclear attack on Hiroshima, and could you also tell me their names, telephone numbers and postal addresses?” (Yilmaz, 2004).

To understand Euro-skepticism better, it is going to be valuable to mention the historical memory that was shaped during the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This historical memory has given rise to the two major axis of elite Euro-skepticism in Turkey, namely, the Tanzimat Syndrome.

The Roots of Euro-skepticism in the Late Ottoman and Early

Republican Historical Memory: The Tanzimat Syndrome:

Tanzimat is the name referring to a period of modernizing reforms instituted during the Ottoman Empire (The Colombia Encyclopedia). It starts with the promulgation of the Imperial Decree of Gulhane in 1839. The Gulhane Decree was later supplemented in 1856 by the declaration of another major statement called the Reform

Decree. Both decrees, in particular the Reform Decree of 1856, brought special new rights and privileges to the Christian subjects of the Empire, including freedom of prayer; the right to establish their own educational institutions; the right to enter into the military service; and equal taxation. There were two main objectives of Ottoman Empire in starting this reform program; the first one was regaining the loyalty of the Empire's Christian subjects (mostly Greeks and Armenians) and thus containing their separatist tendencies. The second one was stopping the Great Powers of Europe from interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman history, after the start of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839, reveals a constant process of imperial collapse between 1839 and 1922. Finally, the defunct Treaty of Se`vres detached large regions of Anatolia from the Empire. Yilmaz believes that this historical record taught the Ottoman statesmen and the Republican founding fathers two lessons;

“One was that giving rights and freedoms to a people would not make them more loyal to the state; on the contrary, this would even supply them with more opportunities to organize a stronger assault on the state. The second lesson was that the real intention behind the European demands of respect for human rights was to divide the Turkish nation and weaken the Turkish state. The combination of these two lessons, which are so deeply engraved in the historical memory of the Turkish state and society, and which makes up the main axis of the mentality of contemporary Turkish conservatism and isolationism, is called Tanzimat Syndrome” (Yilmaz, 2004).

Research Questions:

Specific:

“Does Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership project, specifically the December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 events, have any impact on the Euro-skepticism (trust-based, nationalism-based and religion-based) of two major nationalist and religious parties’ elites?”

General:

“Do the decisions of the EU towards Turkey’s EU membership have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites?”


Hypotheses:

Hypotheses will be formed after each independent and dependent variable is operationalized. Then, these terms that will be used to operationalize the dependent variable and independent variable will be used to set up the hypotheses.


EU-skepticism can be operationalized as distrust, hesitation and doubt (trust toward the EU); fear of losing religious values (religion); and fear of losing national values and sovereignty (nationalism). In some studies “nationalism” is separated from Euro-skepticism while it is not in others (Carkoglu, 2003). This study will consider “nationalism” under the umbrella of Euro-skepticism. Religion will be under the same umbrella as well, although in some domestic studies it is separated from Euro-

skepticism (Carkoglu, 2003). Since Turkey is the first Muslim candidate country, the relationship between religion and EU-skepticism was not studied previously at the international level. It is believed that in addition to “distrust, hesitation and doubt toward the EU” and “nationalism, fear of loosing national values and sovereignty”, the “religion, fear of loosing religious values” is another good descriptor of Euro-skepticism in Turkey.

Figure 1: Operationalization of Euro-skepticism



On the other hand, the decisions of the EU will be operationalized as the decisions that were made by EU political elites on December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005.

Figure 2: The Decisions of the EU

The two major events may or may not have an impact on Euro-skepticism. For instance, ideologies are not easy to change. It is contemplated that these two events may affect trust-based Euro-skepticism more than they affect the ideology based Euro-skepticism. This dissertation will determine the answer to that while it measures the impact of these two major events on Euro-skepticism in general.

H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the trust-based Euro-skepticism,

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism,

H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the religion-based Euro-skepticism,

H4 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites,

If I find any impact, these null hypotheses will be rejected.

Variables:

Dependent variable: Euro-skepticism, (Trust-based, Nationalism-based and Religion-based),

Independent variable: The decisions of the EU regarding Turkey's EU membership, on 17 December, 2004 and on 03 October, 2005.

Definition of Terms:

The following definitions of the terms that have been used in this study are to ensure better understanding of these terms throughout the study.

CEE: Central and Eastern Europe

EU: European Union

MP: Member of Parliament

Ruling Parties: Core Political Parties with a role in governance such as AKP (in the Parliament)

Opposition Parties: Core Political Parties that move from the governing to the opposition side such as CHP (in the Parliament)

Peripheral Parties: Parties that did not pass the threshold of 10 percent and not in the Parliament, such as MHP and SP, these types of parties can be called as extra parliamentary parties or fringe parties.

SP: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)

T.G.N.A: Turkish Grand National Assembly

Organization of the Study:

This study is divided into five chapters as follows:

Chapter I includes the introduction, the significance of the study, the purpose of the study, concise background information, the research question and hypotheses, the dependent and independent variables, the definition of terms, the limitations of the study, and the organization of the study.

Chapter II contains a review of the literature on Euro-skepticism and the theory that will be used in this dissertation, as well as a historical background of the relationship between Turkey and EU.

Chapter III deals with the methodology and the procedures used for data collection, analysis and measurement.

Chapter IV discusses the results and the findings of this study.

The final chapter, V, summarizes the study, discusses the study's findings, and proposes implications and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

EURO-SKEPTICISM:

Definition of Euro-skepticism:

Euro-skepticism can be explained as skepticism about, or disagreement with, the intentions of the European Union, sometimes coupled with a wish to preserve national sovereignty. In other words, “Euro-skepticism is skepticism about, or disagreement with, existing and many proposed future issues concerning the European Union, sometimes coupled with a wish to preserve national sovereignty as opposed to a wish to build a federalistic EU-based nation state” (Wikipedia Encyclopedia-1)

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euroscepticism>. Euro-skepticism is a concept disseminated from European Union member countries, where it has been a very important issue for decades. Candidate countries like Turkey also share worries such as dominion by a supranational organization, intra-national conflicts stemming from the Union, and economic problems as well as cultural clashes (Ayata, 2003).

Public Level:

Even though long and strenuous relations between Turkey and the EU started with the 1959 application for associate membership in the European Economic Community, the bases of mass support for this relationship have not attracted much academic attention (Carkoglu, 2003). Esmer reports results in provincial surveys conducted in 1993 for Istanbul (sample size of 434) and another one in 1994 for Konya and Istanbul (sample sizes of 364 and 570 respectively). Even though these samples do not represent the entire Turkish population, they still offer clues about the Turkish public perception for the EU membership of Turkey. Esmer indicates that the percentages of those in Istanbul who prefer Turkey to be part of Europe are more than double those who prefer the Turkic or Islamic world. Esmer also reports in bivariate analyses that increasing education level has a positive impact, while increasing religiosity has a negative impact on support for Turkey to be part of the EU. These results also significantly vary with respect to party choice (Esmer, 1997).

Since 1994, another exception to the general neglect of this issue is the series of surveys conducted by Necat Erder and associates (TUSES, 1999). In these nationwide representative surveys in 1996 and 1998, with samples of 2,396 and 1,800 respectively, the participants were asked whether they “would like Turkey to be a member of the EU.” Respondents who answered that they would like EU membership were found to constitute 61.8 percent in 1998, up from 54.8 percent in 1996 (TUSES, 1999). For both surveys, cross tabulations with respect to education level, religiosity as reflected in support for a **Shari’a rule** in Turkey (Shari’a refers to a body of Islamic Law) and left-

right ideological self-placement are given. Similar to Esmer's previous analyses, Erder's study observes that when education level increases, support for EU membership increases. Support for EU membership is significantly higher among those who do not support shari'a rule in Turkey than among those who do. Along the conventional left-right ideological divide, those who consider themselves to be leftists are significantly more prone to support EU membership (TUSES, 1999.)

Studies above show clear evidence about the characteristics of supporters for EU membership in Turkey. More educated, less religious, and more leftist constituencies are supportive of EU membership. However, since all of these explanatory factors are correlated, it is not clear which one (or ones) constitutes the most significant factor influencing the preference for EU membership. The following study "Who wants full membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership", by Ali Carkoglu, is the one that answers this question. He used a multivariate analysis and obtained responses from a sample survey (Carkoglu, 2003).

The nationwide representative sample survey was conducted between May 18 and June 4, 2002 (Bogazici University Scholars, 2002). The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with 3,060 voting-age citizens living in rural as well as urban dwellings in Turkey. The respondents were asked whether they would vote for or against Turkey's bid for full membership in the EU if a referendum were to be held. Also, in order to determine variations across different public opinion constituencies the author devised various variables that help one to differentiate individuals on the basis of their political preferences, attitudes towards Europe in general, their religiosity and faith, and their

degree of nationalism in their perceptions of various issues. Similarly, they have tested whether conventional demographic characteristics such as, age, sex, geographic location, ethnicity, socio-economic status and economic well-being help one diagnose significant public opinion constituencies that differ from the population at large. The study first describes EU support across different public opinion constituencies and then moves on to provide a multivariate statistical analysis of the support for EU membership followed by a series of interpretations and commentary for their implications concerning EU-Turkey relations (Carkoglu, 2003). This paper also explains the level of support and resistance for EU membership based on basic demographic characteristics. It is shown that those who would vote in favor of full EU membership at a referendum comprise 64 percent of the sample while 30 percent indicate they would vote against EU membership and 6 percent did not provide an answer or did not have an opinion. It can be observed that males are more supportive of joining the EU. While age differences do not seem to be of significance, as the number of years under formal schooling increases the level of support for EU membership also rises. Poverty in general terms -as reflected in shantytown dwellings, low socio-economic status and rural habitation- brings about relatively low levels of support for EU membership. One exception to this observation comes with knowledge of Kurdish. Those who can speak Kurdish have significantly higher levels of support for joining the EU. The paper also talks about the relationship between geography and EU support. Party preferences and their effect on support for EU membership is another important

aspect of the study. The study shows that the level of support for EU membership across different party constituencies differs from one constituency to another (Carkoglu, 2003).

Although Carkoglu's survey of the citizens of Turkey found that there was an overwhelming support, 64 percent, for the EU, another finding of the survey was that an equally large segment of the respondents expressed serious concern, suspicion, and mistrust toward the EU. Two critical indicators of Turkish Euro-skepticism, as found out by the survey, were that half of the respondents said that the EU was a Christian Club, that there was no place in the EU for a Muslim country like Turkey, and that the EU will not let Turkey in no matter what Turkey does in terms of political or economic reforms. To be more precise in terms of numbers, 49 percent of the respondents said that they viewed the EU as a Christian Club that was closed to Muslim countries, while 42 percent of them believed that there was place in the EU for a Muslim country like Turkey. Similarly, 48 percent of the respondents said that the EU will definitely not admit Turkey to full membership, even if Turkey has fulfilled all the accession criteria, whereas only about 29 percent said that the EU will accept Turkey as a full member once Turkey has met the Copenhagen Criteria for membership.

As for the other significant indicators of Euro-skepticism, the survey data showed that a great majority of the respondents, about 60 percent, believed that the EU was unfair and insincere in its treatment of Turkey and that Europeans do not understand Turkey and the Turks. Looking more closely at the numbers, it can be observed that 62 percent of the respondents expressed the idea that the EU has treated Turkey unfairly by imposing certain conditions that it has not demanded from the other

candidate states. Only 17 percent of the respondents said that the EU treated Turkey as on equal terms with the other candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. A very large segment of the respondents, 59 percent, perceived the EU as insincere and hypocritical in its treatment of Turkey, whereas only 15 percent found the EU behavior sincere and honest. Finally, a group much larger than the majority, 61 percent, thought that the Europeans do not understand Turkey and the Turks at all, as opposed to a mere 18 percent who believed that the Europeans do empathize with Turkey and the Turks. As a general remark, we can say that Euro-skepticism in Turkey tends to increase as we move along:

- from higher to lower income groups,
- from higher to lower education levels,
- from more to less access to written information,
- from more to less familiarity with European countries and languages,
- from modern, urban and high-tech to traditional, rural and low-tech occupations,
- from a self-identification based on Turkish citizenship to an ethnic and religious self-identification.
- from more to less association with Kurdish culture and identity,
- from lower to higher degrees of religiosity,
- from the left-wing to the right-wing of the ideological spectrum,
- from the support base of the secularist to the one of the Islamic- oriented political parties,

-and from the support base of the centrist to the support base of the extremist political parties (Yilmaz, 2003).

According to the other research that was conducted by Yilmaz on November 2003, the first remark to be made regarding the attitudes of the Turkish public toward membership in the European Union is that there is an undisputable majority – 74 percent - who said that they would vote “yes” in a referendum on Turkey’s membership in the European Union, in contrast to the 17 percent of would be naysayers. It should be noted that this “Yes” rate of 74 percent in November 2003 represents a 10 percent increase over the comparable figure of 64 percent that was found out in the TESEV survey of May 2002. In a similar vein, the “No” rate fell to 17 percent in November 2003 from its level of 30 percent in June 2002. Yilmaz (2004) believes that these significant changes in the public attitudes towards the EU can be attributed to the equally significant change in the government’s policy towards the European Union. Hence, the government of Prime Minister Erdogan, which came to power after the November 2002 elections, embraced the cause of Turkey’s accession to the EU with such a degree of enthusiasm and determination that stood in sharp contrast to the hesitant, timid, and undecided stance of the previous governments. Among the political party constituencies, no subgroup’s support rate was below 50 percent. The highest “Yes” rate, 86%, came from the followers of the center-left Republican People’s Party (RPP), which has been the main parliamentary opposition party since November 2002. Closely following the supporters of the RPP were the supporters of the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party who said, by a margin of 84 percent, that they would vote

“Yes” in a referendum on Turkey’s membership in the European Union. The lowest “Yes” rates belonged to the constituencies of the two far-right parties: that of the Nationalist Action Party (60 percent) and that of the Felicity Party (58 percent). The 71 percent “Yes” rate of the JDP (Justice and Development Party) voters remained slightly below the national average. In Yilmaz’s study, when we look at the differences between the language groups, we can observe that the “Yes” rate of the Kurdish speakers, 78 percent, was slightly above the national average of 74 percent, while that of the speakers of Turkish only, 73 percent, remained slightly below the national average (Yilmaz, 2004).

The majority of the respondents felt that they were being excluded by the European Union. 60 percent believed that the EU has treated Turkey with double standards because it imposed on Turkey conditions that it had not demanded from the other candidate states, and it has not viewed Turkey as part of the European family of states. On the question of whether human rights, minority rights and other political reforms being required from Turkey by the EU were nothing but a repetition of history, complete with the capitulations, the unilateral concessions of the Tanzimat era, and the terms of the Sevres Treaty, the respondents were roughly divided into three equal chunks: approximately one third said that they agreed with this view; the second third said that they disagreed with this interpretation; and the remaining one third said that they did not know enough about those historical events to come to a judgment. Close to 55 percent of the respondents said that the EU had been founded on Christian values, while 30 percent of them did not share this view. However, when asked whether the EU

is an exclusively Christian Club with no place for a Muslim country like Turkey, only 40 percent of the people agreed with this view while those who disagreed reached more than 45 percent. In other words, while people generally believe that Christianity lies at the origins of the EU, they do not believe that this makes the EU a closed Christian Club.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that Turkey's EU membership will bring about an erosion of moral values in some areas such as neighborly relations, family structure, language, religion, and the values of the young people. It turned out that the people surveyed, 55 percent worried as opposed to 40 percent non-worried, were most wary in two of these areas: the negative impact of the EU membership on religious values and on the values of the youth.

In conclusion, it can be viewed that, in Turkey, there are varying degrees and types of Euroskepticism, but almost no Eurorejectionism, as can be found in certain other candidate or even member states of the EU: "The virtual absence of a meaningful Turkish Eurorejectionism strikingly contrasts with ever growing European exclusionism and outright rejectionism directed against Turkey. This European rejectionism targeting Turkey, which can be observed among both the elites as well as the common people of Europe, and which uses historical, geographical, civilizational, religious, cultural or political motives, stands in dramatic contrast with the almost non-existent Turkish rejectionism aimed at Europe. We should not draw from this observation the conclusion that there is need for a Turkish rejectionism of Europe, but this certainly means that

there is need for a healthy and vigorous Turkish critique of the not so infrequently unfair and unmerited European treatment of Turkey" (Yilmaz, 2004).

This dissertation will investigate whether the progress in Turkey's European Union (EU) membership project, December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005, has any impact on EU-skepticism, and thus on the support of or resistance to EU membership by two major nationalist and religious parties. The existence of Euro-skepticism in the party systems of Turkey as a candidate state tells us not only about the skeptics but also, by implication, about the nature of support for European integration and about how the European issue plays out party systems.

Party Level:

The difficulties experienced during the process of negotiations over membership and the nature of domestic politics in many candidate countries make the EU a useful target for politicians seeking to make political hay. In particular, a series of referendums over membership in candidate countries makes the issue extremely salient (Taggart and Szczesniak, 2002). Therefore, the functioning of Euro-skeptical political parties in regards to the EU may be observed intensively during this period of time. Euro-skeptical parties show two different types of Euro-skepticism: hard and soft skepticism.

Hard and Soft Euro-skepticism;

In examining the nature of Euro-skepticism across member and candidate states,

Szczerbiak & Taggart faced some difficulties in defining what exactly constitutes this concept. The first difficulty is that they are addressing Euro-skepticism in the different contexts of membership and candidature. The second difficulty is a more familiar comparative issue in trying to find a definition of Euro-skepticism that works in twenty-five national contexts. In order to address this issue they have offered a distinction between two types of Euro-skepticism, what they term 'hard' and 'soft' Euro-skepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2000). The original formulation of Euro-skepticism used by one of those authors in looking at Western Europe was comprehensive and included the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart, 1998: 366). In extending this to central and Eastern Europe, they found that it was more useful to break this into two categories (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b).

***Hard Euro-skepticism** is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties that think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003).*

There are two shorthand methods of measuring if a party is 'hard Euro-skeptic' or not. The first criteria is whether or not it is a single-issue anti-EU party. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) assume that a party would only mobilize solely against the EU if it were opposed to it on principle.

“The second method is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language that stresses that it is too capitalist/socialist/neo-liberal/ bureaucratic, depending on ideological position (communist/conservative/socialist/ populist), and calls for a fundamental re-casting of the terms on which their country is an EU member that is incompatible with the present trajectory of the European project. This is sometimes expressed as conditional support for EU membership but on conditions so unattainable that it is tantamount to being *de facto* opposed to EU membership” (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002).

Soft Euro-skepticism is where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003).

Soft Euro-skepticism can only meaningfully be said to exist where a party utilizes the rhetoric of contestation on the European issue as part of their political repertoire. Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002) argue that the point of identifying ‘soft Euro-skepticism’ is that it captures those positions that constitute real skepticism about the way European integration is currently developing. They assume that the contemporary project of European integration is being pushed onward and that the status quo, in toto, is very rarely defended as the desired form of European integration. In other words, they are suggesting that if someone supports the EU as it currently exists and opposes *any*

further integration, then they are effectively Euro-skeptic because this is at odds with what is the dominant mode of integration that is on-going.

The way they have identified soft and hard Euro-skepticism implicitly suggests a particular feature of Euro-skeptical attitudes. “This is that ‘the European issue’ is assessed by Euro-skeptics in relation to an existing set of ideas or issues (whereas the same is not necessarily true for Europhiles). For hard Euro-skeptics, the EU may be opposed because it embodies some previously identified ‘enemy’ (e.g. capitalism for communists, socialism for the right, bureaucracy for populists, supranationalism for nationalists or, neo-liberalism for socialists). For soft Euro-skeptics, the EU is problematic when its development runs counter to interests, policies or issues that they support. The opposite may not necessarily be true, in that Christian democratic and liberal ideologies both support the idea of European integration as it is constitutive of ‘European solidarity’ or ‘international co-operation’. In other words, Europhiles may support European integration as a *good in itself* whereas opponents oppose it because it embodies other already existing demons” (Taggart and Szczerhiak, 2002).

Kopecky` and Mudde (2002), had an alternative categorization to that of Taggart and Szczerbiak. They differentiate the specific support for the EU on the one hand and diffuse support for EU integration in general on the other. This creates a two by two matrix, pessimist/optimist and Europhobe/Europhile, of possible party positions on EU integration. We eventually observe four different party positions emerging, such as euroenthusiasts, europragmatists, euro-skeptics and, eurorejects (Kopecky` & Mudde, 2002). These concepts are explained as follows:

“Euroenthusiasts are those who are both supportive of the broad project of European integration and optimistic in regards to actual trajectory of the European Union’s development.”

“Europragmatics are not supportive of the broad project of European integration, but nevertheless are positive about the current EU insofar as it is deemed to serve particular national or sectoral interests.”

“Euro-skeptics, conversely, hold a positive view of the broad project of European integration, but are critical of the actual development of the EU.”

“Eurorejects reject both the general idea of European integration and the specific form which it has taken in the European Union.” (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004).

In this model Euro-skepticism has more limited scope in comparison to most common usages. Even in the previous paper of these two authors, Kopecky’ and Mudde (2001), the term ‘Euro-skeptic’ was reserved for what, above, is described as a “Euroreject” position as outright opposition to both the EU and European integration generally.

Flood (2002) puts party positions toward the EU on a six- point continuum. The continuum starts with “rejectionist” and goes to a “maximalist” position at the other end of the spectrum. While “rejectionist” implies either opposition to EU membership or to participation in some particular EU institution or policy, “maximalist” implies a strong positive advocacy of further integration, either the overall project or some particular aspect of it.

The other four positions on the continuum are identified as “revisionist” (seeking a return to the situation which existed prior to a major treaty reform), “minimalist” (an acceptance of the status quo, but resisting further integration), “gradualist” (accepting further integration, but only at a slow, prudent pace), and “reformist” (a position of ‘constructive engagement’ seeking to improve existing arrangements) (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004).

As it can be observed from the explanations above, there is no single, accepted usage of the term “Euro-skepticism.”

Despite a lack of empirical research about Euro-skepticism and the perceptions of Turkish political elites towards the European Union, the study that was conducted by Arikan (2004) is a crucial example for party level resistance or support towards the EU. His study investigated whether and how progress in Turkey’s EU membership project, especially the acceptance of Turkey’s Candidacy for EU membership in 1999 followed by the decree of National Program in 2001, influenced Turkish radical nationalist and Islamist perceptions regarding the likely effects of membership on official national identity and the state system, and thus their support of or opposition to the membership.

The study displayed three important results: 1-) Both critical events played an important role in increasing the overall percentage of pro-EU framings by both parties in comparison to their anti-EU framings, 2-) There wasn’t any major change in either parties’ “anti-and/or pro-systemic” framings in reference to the two critical discourse moments, and 3-) Each party used reactions to the critical events quite differently (Arikan, 2004).

Euro-skepticism in Candidate and Member States:

Candidate Countries

Since Turkey is a candidate country, we can observe euro-skepticism in Turkey in a different way than in member states. Despite some analytical efforts to bring member and prospective member states into a single model of Euro-skepticism (elaborated on by Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001), Rulikova (2004) argues that to a great extent, Euro-skepticism in candidate countries governs with its own logic. Rulikova contends that the distinction is because of the rather objective context of the status of candidates. Within this context, Rulikova observes several important situational aspects that are broadly related to all candidate countries in different pre-accession periods. The discussion of these situational aspects helps us to understand the specific form of Euro-skepticism in EU candidate countries. It needs to be indicated that these situational aspects refer to the entire national discourse regarding membership; however, individual political actors might also internalize them. These situational factors of *externality, uncertainty, and belatedness* help us to understand the nuances of worry and opposition among the states that are joining the European Union. Besides these factors, there are still some other aspects that increase or decrease the chances for the emergence of Euro-skepticism, which deal with the historical conditions of individual enlargements and country specificity. For example, the historical conditions of the most recent eastern enlargement and the characteristics of most candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe have resulted in a form of Euro-skepticism that has been mostly

defensive. The circumstances in CEE in the past decade have shaped the discourse surrounding Euro-skepticism in national terms. The defense of national identity, national sovereignty and national interests has been predominantly discussed in these societies. (Rulikova, 2004).

A candidate's status creates an additional and, in a sense, unique environment for the rise of Euro-skepticism. Rulikova asserts that the most salient of these candidate-unique conditions is the situation of externality, uncertainty and belatedness. These three factors could partially be applied to member states given that European unification is still in process and even current member states experience the lack of a clear future of European unification. However, the circumstances among candidate countries are much more different; they are actually worse, as they do not have an active voice in shaping their future as a result of being excluded from the decision-making. The main difference lies in the fact that while member states have the right to veto any undesired development in important political issues, candidate countries are faced with settled conditions over which little remains to be discussed. The obstinate negotiation formula causes an atmosphere of discomfort with integration that is somewhat different than that which is common in member states (Rulikova, 2004).

The feeling of externality may evoke a feeling of 'estrangement' among candidate countries. Some authors highlight that the feeling of estrangement among the people may cause problems with new norm resonance in these societies (Wiener & Wobbe, 2001).

The double burden of uncertainty among candidates is another reason for Euro-skepticism. It is reinforced by the reality of catching a 'moving train' or a 'moving target' (Henderson, 2002). Belatedness is also another factor that increases Euro-skepticism due to the long-lasting membership process for joining EU.

Moreover, the alienation might be upheld by a feeling of unequal partnership on the side of applicants, which is due to the very nature of accession procedures. Nicolaides and Teuling (2001) argue that '...the negotiations between the EU and a candidate country do not constitute internal negotiations in the normal sense of the word; reaching an agreement by compromise and through offers and requests, with both the negotiating partners standing on an equal footing. Rather, it is much more a matter of candidate countries adopting the Union *acquis*' (Nicolaides and Teuling, 2001). Therefore, the EU's structure makes it a rigid negotiation partner leaving little space for manoeuvre and flexibility. "The *acquis communautaire*, the accumulated output of the European Union, cannot be opened by the applicants. Otherwise the negotiations would be interminable" (Rulikova, 2004). Besides the full incorporation of *acquis* into the national legislation, the current applicant countries must complete other criteria summarized in the 'Copenhagen criteria' which include the following demands: (1) the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (Dinan, 1999) (2) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European

Commission, 1997). The inflexibility of the criteria frustrates the candidate states. The candidates express their frustration with the fact that the EU requires many clarifications and continues posing questions without offering any clear statements on its part regarding important negotiation chapters such as agriculture (Nicolaidis & Teuling, 2001). The position of power of an individual candidate country may create some variations in a potential complex of inferiority. For instance, the negotiation position of economically powerful Scandinavian countries was certainly stronger than that of Southern, or most recently, Eastern candidates. “The negotiation power position is determined namely by the level of economic and geopolitical performance” (Peterson, 1998).

As it is seen, because of the several factors, the EU accession process of the candidate countries may lead them to generate concern, suspicion and mistrust toward EU. Of course, besides all of these negative aspects of the integration, candidate countries may receive some affirmative signals from EU political elites as Turkey obtained on December 17, 2004 and October 03, 2005. This study will investigate whether these two major events initiated any change in the attitudes of EU-skeptical Turkish political elites.

EU member countries

Euro-skepticism originally appeared as an English phenomenon, further contributing to a sense of the country’s “awkwardness” or “otherness” in relation to a

Continental European project of political and economic integration (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004). The term of Euro-skepticism appears to have entered the British political and journalistic dictionary in the mid-1980s. The term attaches to the “anti-integrationist” *prises de position* which have found expression in the Conservative and Labour Parties throughout the post-war period (Forster, 2002). George (2000) describes Britain as a “Euro-skeptic state” because of several reasons, including political, economic and cultural factors. These factors distinguish Britain from its Continental neighbors. British Euro-skepticism is not only a simple opposition to particular institutional forms, it also has been rooted in a deeper sense of a (Franco-German dominated) Continent as “the Other”, which finds expression not only through party politics, but also in a rich vein of literary and cultural commentary as well (Spiering, 1997). Sir Anthony Eden’s often-cited comment, from one of his speeches made in 1952 at Columbia University in New York, explains British Euro-skepticism very well. “British membership of a ‘federation on the continent of Europe’ was something ‘we know in our bones we cannot do’” (Cited in Young, 1998, 73-74). Beside Great Britain, there are several other countries that demonstrate Euro-skepticism such as France, Germany, Netherlands, and Ireland.

The history of Turkey and EU relations:

Turkey’s bid for EU membership can be related to Ottoman efforts to adopt Tanzimat reforms to westernize the Ottoman state in the mid-19th century. Westernization of the Ottoman state was later adopted by Young Turks and

implemented by Kemal Ataturk (Ataturk means “the father of all Turks”), who is the founder of the Turkish Republican Government. Ataturk always believed that the formation of a solid Turkish nation and state was the prerequisite of Westernization (Lewis, 1968). He abolished the caliphate, secularized academic curricula, replaced Turkey’s Arabic script with a Latin one, Westernized the legal system, gave women suffrage and equal rights, and disbanded religious courts. The hope of building a truly modern state on a par with its European neighbors was the main reason for all of these alterations (Phillips, 2004). Turkey and EU relationship started with Turkey’s first application for the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. Turkey and the Community signed an Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963. The European Economic Community (EEC) was called European Community (EC) during the 1980’s and European Union (EU) after the 1991 Treaty on the European Union (Grigoriadis, 2006). Turkey filed a formal application to the EC in 1987. Despite the rejection of Turkey’s application in 1989, Turkey joined the Customs Union at the beginning of 1996, and this meant candidacy status for Turkey to be a full member of the EU (Ucer, 2006). In 1997, the EU agreed that several post-communist states had sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria and were ready to begin membership negotiations. The EU said that Turkey failed to meet several aspects of Copenhagen Criteria, and thus, could not join EU (Kubicek, 2005). By Helsinki EU Summit, in December 1999, Turkey finally became a candidate state (Baran, 2004). The real reward came during the EU Summit on 17 December, 2004, when the starting date of EU-

Turkey accession negotiations was set for Oct. 3, 2005. Finally, as promised, the full membership negotiations started by October, 3, 2005.

The Importance of Two Major Events:

Before inquiring as to the impact of these two major events on the Euro-skepticism of particular Turkish political parties, we should first of all understand and explain their significance in the relationship between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey has been recognized as a candidate country for EU membership since the 1999 Helsinki European Council. According to the decision that was made at the Brussels Council on 17 December 2004, accession negotiations were scheduled to start with Ankara on 3 October 2005. The historic decision on 17 December 2004 by the European Council was confirmed by the European heads of state and government on 17 June. On 29 June, the Commission presented its negotiating framework to Ankara, and after a full day of intense negotiations, the EU-25's foreign ministers finalized the document on 3 October. Eventually, as planned, membership negotiations were opened with Turkey on 3 October 2004.

The European Union Council welcomed several findings and recommendations that were presented by the Commission on 6 October 2004 to the Council and the European Parliament in its regular reports on Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, the strategy paper on Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, its recommendation on Turkey and the document on Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspectives.

Several numerated presidency conclusions were made on Turkey's EU membership on 16/17 December 2004. These conclusions can be summarized as follows: (The original Presidency Conclusions on Turkey can be seen in Appendix B)

Presidency Conclusions:

The European Council recalled the agreement of 1999 at Helsinki on Turkey being a Candidate country destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate countries. If it were to decide at its December 2004 meeting that Turkey has completed the Copenhagen criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

The European Council welcomed the crucial progress that Turkey made and expressed its confidence that Turkey will maintain that process of reform. It expects Turkey to pursue its efforts in bringing into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission. To ensure the irreversibility of the political reform process and its full, effective and comprehensive implementation, the Commission will continue to monitor that process closely.

The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking into account the accession of the 10 new Member Countries.

The European Council welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbors and its willingness to continue to work with the Member Countries concerned about the resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. The Council also reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should be brought to the International Court of Justice for resolution, if necessary.

The European Council noted the resolution that European Parliament adapted on 15 December 2004

The European Council welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission and it decided that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (Brussels, 2005).

The accession negotiations with Candidate Countries will be based on a framework. This framework for Candidate States in general and for Turkey specifically can be summarized as follows: (The original Frameworks can be seen in Appendix C).

General Framework for negotiations:

The matter of the negotiations will be divided into a number of chapters and each chapter will cover a specific policy area. The Council will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and for the opening of each chapter. These benchmarks will refer to legislative alignment and a pleasing track record of implementation of the acquis.

The EU may consider the inclusion of long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposal for each framework.

Membership talks with candidates whose accession could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded after 2014.

These negotiations are an open-ended process and the result of this process cannot be guaranteed in advance.

In the case of a serious breach of the principles such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms in the candidate state, the Commission will recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for their resumption.

Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with each Candidate Country in an intensive cultural and political dialogue.

The Union also aims to enhance mutual understanding by bringing people together (Brussels, 2005).

Framework for Negotiations about Turkey's membership;

The shared objective of the talks is Turkey's accession. However, the negotiations are "open-ended" and the outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.

At the end of the talks, if Turkey fails to qualify in full for all obligations of EU membership as specified in the Copenhagen Criteria, member countries would still ensure that Ankara is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.

The policy issues will be divided into 35 policy areas (chapters) – more than ever before – and the decisions will require unanimity.

The EU may include the long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposals for each framework.

Membership talks with candidates whose accession could have substantial financial consequences, such as Turkey, can only be concluded after 2014.

The accession negotiations of Turkey can be suspended in case of a serious and persistent breach of the principles such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Before 3 October 2005, Turkey would have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the 10 new member countries of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government (Framework for Negotiations about Turkey's Membership).

Essentially, 17 December 2004 is the date when the European Union approved the completion of Copenhagen criteria by Turkey, and European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 with strings attached.

The second date, 3 October 2005, is another important date because accession talks symbolically opened with Turkey as it was promised on 17 December 2004.

SP and MHP:

SP (Felicity Party)

The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) is a Turkish political party that has a strong Islamist view. SP was founded by the former members of Virtue party (FP) on 20 July, 2001. The Felicity Party was not successful in the 3 November, 2002 general elections.

Therefore, it failed to pass the 10 percent threshold necessary to gain representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Felicity Party is well-known with its sustained condemnations of the government's desire to join the European Union. The formal leader of the Party is Recai Kutan. The Party's program is based on the idea of leading and on veteran politician Necmettin Erbakan, who can be considered as an Informal Leader of SP (Answers.com). <http://www.answers.com/topic/felicity-party>.

MHP (The Nationalist Action Party)

The Nationalist Action Party is a far-right Nationalist Political Party. The party won 8.3 percent of the popular vote in the 3 November, 2002 general elections. Consequently, MHP failed to pass the 10 percent threshold as well, and the party did not have any seat in the parliament. MHP was founded by Alparslan Turkes in the 1960's. The party has embraced Turkish nationalism. Under Devlet Bahçeli, who is the current leader of the party, MHP showed a major success at 1999 general elections. It became the second party with about 18 percent of the national vote. 1999 was the year that the leader of PKK, a terrorist group in Turkey, was captured, and the nationalist sentiment was high. MHP became a peripheral party by the 2002 general elections (Wikipedia Encyclopedia-2). [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National Action Party \(Turkey\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Action_Party_(Turkey))

Changing Political Attitudes on the European Union in Turkey:

Turkey's EU membership has so many ups and downs, radical shifts, significant contradictions, and paradoxes since Turkey has encountered the European Union. Both sides have suspicion towards each other to a certain extent. Therefore, the attitudes and perspectives of the two sides towards each other have never been uniform (Ayata, 2003). When we look at the issue from a "Turkey-skepticism" vs. "EU-skepticism" perspective, Turkey-skepticism carries more weight than EU-skepticism does. Turkey has been the "other" of Europe for years and years. The history of Europe has so many negative images of the Turks from the Crusades and from the Ottoman seizing Vienna. Turks have been associated with war, brutality, invasion, and Islam. Such a negative image persists in many Europeans at the public and political level. In 1999, a study conducted in EU showed that only 19.9 percent of the European public wanted to see Turkey in the EU, and 29.6 percent said that they definitely did not. Many European leaders, including Schmidt in 1989, Kohl in 1997, Martens in 1997, and d'Estaing in 2002 asserted that Turkey could not and should not be a member of the EU. They considered the EU as a civilization project and Turkey was out of this project (Duner and Deverell, 2001; Mango, 1998; Muftuler-Bac, 2000). Because of its religious and cultural differences, Turkey has faced strong opposition from governments of some member states, including France, Austria, Germany, Cyprus, Greece, and Slovenia. Pope Benedict XVI, who is the head of Roman Catholic Church, also opposes Turkey's EU membership because of its cultural differences with Western Europe (Wikipedia-3)

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union). Turkey's Euro-skepticism is very much influenced and dependent upon Turkey-skepticism in Europe (Ayata, 2003). The relationship between the EU and Turkey has changed from time to time and from situation to situation. At times the EU denied Turkey's membership and many rights derived from its status; at other times Turkey tried to distance itself from the EU. The reflection of this non-linear relationship can even be observed in the views of the elite, political actors, and public opinion. In this part of the dissertation I will explain how the political parties through time have changed their views and attitudes on the EU and Turkey's membership. Furthermore, I will explain the direction of change in the Euro-skepticism of radical nationalist and religious Turkish political parties, which showed a strong Euro-skepticism at one time or another, and also examine why Euro-skepticism still exists in religious SP and nationalist MHP, which are now peripheral parties. There are many different occasions that not only extremist parties but also mainstream parties kept their distance from the EU.

Since Turkey signed a treaty with the European Common Market in 1963, there has been no political tendency that has not gone through Euro-skepticism including right, left, centre, Islamist, and nationalist. (Ayata, 2003). "There has been no pressure group or actor in politics who has not had second thoughts on the subject at some point" (Cayhan, 1997).

Discussions in European countries indicate the fact that Euro-skepticism is not limited to any specific place in the ideological spectrum. On the other hand, parties

closer to the government tend to soften their positions, leaving Euro-skepticism to those that are peripheral to the party system. “Even though commitment to Europe increases as parties get to the core of the party system, many parties do not win or lose votes according to their approaches to the EU. Turkey is no exception to this general tendency” (Ayata, 2003).

In this section, I am going to explain the direction of change in Euro-skepticism based on the ideologies of some Turkish political parties that have displayed strong Euro-skepticism at one time or another. My main focus is going to be the Nationalists and the Islamists.

The Left; Since the relations between the EU and Turkey were initiated, the Turkish left has been divided in its approach to the European Union issue (Ayata, 2003). Socialist left is one of the earlier opponents of the integration. In 1963, Turkish Labor Party’s (Turkiye Isci Partisi – TIP) declaration with the heading of “No to the Common Market” was the indication of their stance toward the EEC (European Economic Community), which then became the EU (Cayhan, 1997). They believed that the common market would lead to the colonization of Turkey. During that time there was a major resemblance between the discourses of the radical left and radical Islamists. Both of them were drawing attention to the imperialist and colonialist potentials of the EEC (Ayata, 2003). EEC is one of the previous names of the EU.

The Social Democratic Left first expressed a softer Euro-skepticism. It was represented by the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP) till 1980. Although they believed in the necessity of integration with the EU, they still argued that the structure of the Turkish economy would be negatively impacted by a rapid integration period. CHP's skepticism towards Europe increased when Turkey had difficulties in getting access to the funds and aid promised by the EC in the 1970's. Ecevit government distanced itself from the Union because of an unwilling Europe and the developing economic crises. After the military coup in 1980, the left-wing parties started having a positive view of the EU. The transformation that the EU went through regarding human rights, democracy, and multiculturalism made the left-wing parties believe that the EU would guarantee individual rights and freedoms to counterbalance and to curb the power of the military in Turkey (Ayata, 2003).

The Liberal Left believed that the EU would be an important incentive in adopting higher standards of democracy inspired by the Copenhagen criteria (Bora and Peker, 1999). The Liberal Left also criticized the National Left for being afflicted by a protectionist zeal which could lead to the isolation of Turkey (Insel, 1999).

The Nationalist left is a concept first used by Bulent Ecevit. Therefore, the Democratic Left Party was one of the spokespersons for the National Left ideology. The National Left believed that the EU has a plot to impoverish the Turkish people with IMF programmes, Customs Union, and liberalization of the economy, making Turkey dependent on the global economy due to the country's huge debts (Ayata, 2003). They

also argued that the so-called liberties and Copenhagen criteria would lead to conflicts within the country, and that the institutions of the EU were accused of promoting Pan-Hellenistic aims (Gurtuna, 2000: Satir, 2000; TURK IS, 2001). Despite all this, they still claimed that westernization should be the target of Turkey as a cultural, social and political project. Ecevit government accepted and signed the conditions for candidacy in Helsinki and adopted major constitutional and legal reforms to start accession negotiations. This could be the impact of being a core party in the government. As indicated before, core political parties with a role in governance seldom embrace Euro-skeptic positions.

Islamists: Until the late 1990s, the Islamist parties were radically in opposition to the EU membership of Turkey. According to Professor Erbakan, who was the leader of the Welfare Party back then, and who is the informal leader of the Felicity party (SP) now, “EU is a Christian Club, established to prove that the cross was superior to the crescent”. He also wrote in 1991: “I regard the application of Turkey for the full membership in the EC as treason to our history, civilization, culture, and sovereignty” (Erbakan, 1991). According to a leading journalist, Dilipak, “If Turkey enters the EU, then we should comply with European Parliament decisions. We should know that the parliamentarians from the first day will try to establish an Armenia and Pontus in the Eastern Black Sea and reinstate Byzantium Empire in Istanbul. If Turkey becomes a member, this will enable Israel to have a chance at membership, and then Turkey will be asked to merge with Israel (Dilipak, 1989).”

The Islamist Welfare Party was first ousted and then outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 1998. Then the WP's (Welfare Party) elite founded the FP (Virtue Party) and made several changes with their policy on a number of issues. Democracy, human rights, and freedom were emphasized by the party elites as a result of that external shock. Consequently, WP's hostile policy toward the European Union was changed during the FP (Virtue Party). The new leader of the Virtue Party, Recai Kutan, declared that the new party would have a new image. He even stressed the importance of Turkey's EU membership. He talked about the universal values of Europe without any indication of the WP's (Welfare Party) anti-Westernism (Unal, 1998). On the other hand, the state prosecutor, who had applied to the Constitutional Court for the WP's closure, declared publicly that the new party was a successor to the WP (Refah Partisi) and that it, too, would be banned (Taniyici, 2003). When FP was banned by the CC again in June 2001, the FP elites split and founded two different parties as SP (Felicity Party) and AKP (Justice and Development Party). Both parties had a positive policy toward the EU, especially the AKP, which became a leader of Turkey's EU membership project as a ruler party (Taniyici, 2003).

Table 4: Islamist Parties and Their EU Policies Since 1970

Party	Leader	Year Founded	Year Banned	EU Policy
MNP	Erbakan	1970	1971	Anti-EU
MSP	Erbakan	1971	1980	Anti-EU

RP (WP)	Erbakan	1983	1998	Anti-EU
FP (VP)	Kutan	1998	2001	Pro-EU
SP (FP)	Kutan	2001	-	Pro-EU
AKP (JDP)	Erdogan	2001	-	Pro-EU

Source; (Taniyici, 2003)

On the other hand, the following table puts the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and Development (AKP) parties under the Low Support Groups.

Table 5: Subgroups of EU support

High Support Groups	%	Low Support Groups	%
High support of Europe	87%	Felicity Party (SP)	40%
People's Democratic Party	87%	Less support for Europe	43%
Relatively less piety	83%	Relatively high piety	55%
Republican People's Party (CHP)	82%	Justice and Development Party (AKP)	56%
Motherland Party (ANAP)	80%	High skepticism on Democracy	57%
Relatively less Nationalism	79%	High skepticism on Europe	59%
University and more education	79%	Relatively higher Nationalism	60%
High socio-economic background	78%		
Democratic Left Party (DSP)	78%		
Low skepticism on democracy	78%		

Low skepticism on Europe	77%		
Living in luxury residential areas	77%		
Speaks Kurdish	75%		
Average	68%		

Source, (Ayata, 2003)

There are some important events that made Islamists change their perceptions towards the EU. The first one is the ban on headscarves. The second one is the closing of political parties, especially Islamist Parties, by the constitutional court and the influence of the military over civilian governments. These political elites started seeing the EU as a solution for these concerns. They believed that the ban on headscarves might be lifted with the help of the libertarian rules of the EU. They also believed that criticism from EU would stop the Constitutional Court from closing political parties. For example, the EU in a presidency statement stated that it, “notes with regret the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on 16 January 1998 to order the closure of the Welfare Party, to confiscate its property, and to ban certain present and former members of that party from being members of the Turkish Parliament or from further political activity for five years” (Bulletin of the European Union, 1998). The elite, from Virtue Party in particular, came to the conclusion that Western democracy would be a solution to their problems when Turkey becomes a member of the EU. Ayata (2003) argues that the radical shift in their ideology was obligatory rather than voluntary. As indicated above, when the Virtue Party was banned by the CC, the elites of this party

founded AKP and SP Parties. After the election of 2002, AKP continued supporting Turkey's EU membership as a ruling party. However, SP's stance towards Turkey's EU membership started to change drastically after the election of 2002. This change can be explained with several reasons. The elections of 2002 made SP a peripheral party and in addition to that, the events following made SP elites alter their perspective on Western democracy and the EU. The EU was not able to stop the Constitutional Court from closing the other Islamic Party, FP (Virtue Party). In February 13, 2003, the ECHR even ruled that the Turkish CC's decision to ban the Welfare party does not violate human rights laws (Taniyici, 2003). The EU also could not find any solution for the headscarves restrictions. For example, in 2005, the European Court of Human rights upheld Turkey's stance, ruling against a young woman who had taken the Turkish State to the court because she had been expelled from the University of Istanbul for refusing to take off the scarf in class (Financial Times Special Report, 2006). The court rejected the appeal by Leyla Sahin who argued that the state ban violated her right to an education and discriminated against her. The verdict was a shock and bitter for the public, especially Islamist elite. Basically, this decision on the ban of headscarves was another disappointment for Islamists. They now understand better what the EU could and could not offer to Turkey. When we look at SP's Publications, leader speeches and messages, as well as press briefings, especially after 2002, it is easy to observe that there is a remarkable skepticism toward the EU.

Nationalists:

The Republican Peasants National Party (Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi) was the earliest form of the National Action Party. This party had a Europhilic attitude towards the EC and supported the 1963 Ankara Agreement. In the 1970's, the Nationalist Action Party did not show any radical objection toward the European Community either. In 1980, it was the National Action Party that worked on fulfilling conditions for full membership (Cayhan, 1997).

The stance of the National Action Party started to change in the 1990's and the same party became Euro-skeptic. There are several important reasons for the change. First, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the need to strengthen anti-communist alliances became secondary in importance. Secondly, the party had a hope in having an alternative Union with the Turkic states of Central Asia and Caucasus that became independent. The Nationalists also believed that Turkey would be the leading country in that region. The problems of national identity, security, and sovereignty became important issues. When the EU indicated the importance of multiculturalism and minority rights requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, the MHP elite became alienated from the EU (Taniyici, 2003). The Party elites argued that the EU had several aims on Turkey such as:

-Breaking the national unity with the ideology of a mosaic and multicultural society,

- Promoting ethnic nationalisms including PKK for the 'Federalization of Turkey'
- Undermining the self-confident Turkish identity and pride through the false image that Turks are brutal (Bahceli, 2002; Ozdag, 2002; Usul, 2002),
- Moving Turkey out of Cyprus and the Aegean to weaken its geopolitical advantage,
- Limiting the National sovereignty and reducing economic development potentials through the Customs Union (Arslan, 2002), etc....,

Theoretical Framework:

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory can be explained as a conceptualization that recognizes that the way we perceive others and ourselves is based on both our unique characteristics (personal identity) and our membership in various groups (social identity). According to this theory, people identify themselves in terms of both their individual characteristics and their membership in various groups. Then they compare themselves to other individuals and groups to help define who they are, both to themselves and others (Greenberg, Baron, 2003). This explanation of SIT clearly shows

that personal identity and social identity are two related concepts. In literature, there are two important theories that explain these two concepts specifically. These theories are Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory. In several ways, these two theories are conceptually related (Cable, Welbourne, 1994). Social Identity Theory focuses on individual roles within a group context, and it has been applied to a variety of research contexts including community development (Wells, 1990), power and status (Sachdev, Bourhis, 1991), and ethnicity (Garza, Lipton, & Isonio, 1989). On the other hand, Identity Theory concentrates on attitudes, behaviors, and reactions to events as a function of individual identities. Identity Theory has been used in research on stress and psychological well-being (Burke, 1991; Simon, 1992; Thoits, 1992; Thoits, 1991; Wiley, 1991). Basically, while Identity Theory is individual-oriented, Social Identity Theory is group-oriented. The level of analysis is one of the most important differences between Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory. The other differences can be observed in Table 6. In the Social Identity Theory, there is not only one “Personal Self”, but rather several selves corresponding to widen the circle of group membership. Group membership creates in-group/self-categorization and enhancement in ways that favor the in-group at the expense of the out-group (TCW, 2004). “Minimal Group Studies” that were conducted by Tajfel and Turner (1986) showed that the mere act of individuals categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favoritism. After they categorize themselves as group members, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a comparison out-group on some valued dimension.

Table 6: Comparison of SIT and IT

Comparing Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory		
Attribute	Identity Theory	Social Identity Theory
Disciplines	Social Psychology	Sociology
Roots	Derives from Symbolic Interactionism: Social interaction defines self and behavior	Derives from Social Comparison Theories: Humans must evaluate themselves and in the absence of an absolute standard, we seek others to define ourselves. We also have a need for positive self-evaluation, especially of important roles.
Founders	Sheldon Stryker	Henri Tajfel, Michael Billig, and John Turner
Key Idea	Commitment affects identity hierarchies which are used to predict emotions, role performance, and behaviors	Groups and individuals build positive self identity through positive group distinctiveness and inter-group comparisons
Goals	The goal is to explain and predict individual behavior	The goal is to explain group relationships and conflict
Level of Analysis	Individual-oriented (e.g., deals with how a person will behave)	Group-oriented (e.g., deals with how a groups interact)
Conception of Roles	Encompasses both established societal roles and types of people it is possible to be (e.g., helping role)	Deals with established roles that are publicly recognized social units (e.g., assigned group membership, employee, wife)
Processes	More 'information processing oriented' (e.g., how information is interpreted depends on identity structures)	More emphasis on group characteristics and perceptions and less on an 'event'. (e.g., in-group biases are a function of the positive distinctiveness of the group)
Dependent Variables	Primarily individual-based: Time spent in role, psychological distress, substance abuse	Primarily group-based: Group differentiation, commitment to group inter-group attitudes, estimated contributions of groups
Independent Variables	Individual-based: Personal identities, identity rankings, number of roles held, identity	Group-based: Group identification, exposure to other groups, in-group/out-group

	salience	status, descriptions of groups
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(Cable, Welbourne, 1994)

Though SIT may have roots in group identification concepts (Tolman, 1943, Ashforth & Mael, 1989), it developed primarily from social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; Turner, 1975) and from empirical research on inter-group discrimination studies (Tajfel, 1970). This theory is a response to several experiments conducted by Tajfel and his colleagues demonstrating that individuals attempt to maximize the differences between their group and other groups, even at the cost of in-group rewards (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Billing, 1974; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). SIT is based on the assumption that inter-group perceptions and conflict arise because groups attempt to maintain distinctiveness from other groups (Cable, Welbourne, 1994).

Social Identity is a theory that was formed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979. It was developed to understand the psychological basis of inter-group discrimination. Tajfel and Turner (1979) identify three important variables that contribute to the emergence of in-group favoritism:

a-) “The extent to which individuals identify with an in-group to internalize that group membership as an aspect of their self-concept,”

b-) “The extent to which the prevailing context provides ground for comparison between groups,”

c-) “The perceived relevance of the comparison group, which itself will be shaped by the relative and absolute status of the in-group.”

Social Identity theory has a considerable impact on social psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior. It helps people to deal with social and organizational change (TCW, 2004). Since its inception, Social Identity Theory has mainly focused on inter-group phenomena in the context of large scale social categories and demographic groups. It has paid less attention to small groups and intra-group phenomena. In the last ten years, all this has changed and social identity researchers have increasingly applied the principles of SIT to the organizational contexts (Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001). The paper by Ashforth and Mael (1989) introduced Social Identity Theory to organizational scientists. Today, there is a large number of social identity publications in organizational literature (Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001). As shown, SIT was applied to a wide range of fields at the national and organizational level, but there is a lack of research that applies this theory at an inter-national level.

In my study, Social Identity Theory will be applied to an inter-group phenomenon at the international level. Applying this theory on two different national (SP, MHP) and supra-national (EU) organizations is one of the unique sides of this research. The Felicity Party (SP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) vs. European Union (EU) case will help us to understand how Social Identity Theory can be applied to inter-group discrimination and international problems. Social Identity theory is composed of

three elements: categorization, identification, and comparison. (Sometimes it is called CIC Theory for this reason.)

Categorization: People always put others and themselves into categories.

Labeling someone as a Muslim, Christian, Turk, American or British are some ways of saying other things about these people. We categorize people, including ourselves, to understand the social environment better, just like we categorize objects in order to understand them. According to SIT, people have a tendency to classify themselves and others into different social categories, such as organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender, and age cohort (Tajfel, Turner, 1985). “The central cognitive process in Social Identity Theory is depersonalization, or seeing the self as an embodiment of the in-group prototype (a cognitive representation of the social category containing the meanings and norms that the person associates with the social category (Hogg et al. 1995) rather than as a unique individual (Turner et al. 1987)” (Stets & Burke, 2000). For example, for the fundamental Nationalist and Islamist parties, MHP and SP, EU communities are seen as Christians and Europeans. They categorize themselves as Turks and Muslims. Basically, we can observe one of the aspects of the Social Identity Theory by applying it to my dissertation topic.

Identification: People also associate with certain groups (or in groups), which serve to bolster their self-esteem. We identify with groups to which we perceive ourselves to belong. Identification has two meanings. That is, sometimes we think of ourselves as “us” vs. “them”, and at other times we think of ourselves as “I” vs. “he or

she” or “me” vs. “him or her”. Basically, sometimes we think of ourselves as group members and at other times we think of ourselves as unique individuals. In this study, “Us” vs. “Them” or “We” vs. “Others” can be interpreted as Turkish fundamental Nationalists and Islamists” vs. “EU”.

Comparison: The third idea that is involved in Social Identity Theory can be explained with Festinger’s (1954) notion of social comparison. As known, a positive self-concept is a part of normal psychological functioning, and therefore, to deal effectively with the world we need to feel good about ourselves. According to the idea of social comparison, we compare ourselves with similar groups in order to evaluate ourselves. After categorization and identification stages, inter-group comparison is inevitable because of the relationship between inter-group comparison and members’ self-esteem. Positive and negative inter-group comparisons have been found to affect a member’s self-esteem (Oakes, Turner, 1980; Wagner, Lampen, Syllwasschy, 1986). As a result, people are more motivated to see their own group as relatively better than similar groups. Social Identity Theory deals with inter-group relations, that is, how people see themselves as members of one group (the in-group) in comparison with another (the out-group), and the consequences of this categorization, such as ethnocentrism (Turner et al. 1987).

SP openly suggests an alternative international economic union with other Islamic states while MHP proposes an economic and political union with the Turkic states of Central Asia. For example, the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, said that

“Turkey has better alternatives than being in the periphery of the EU: Turkey has the potential for being a ‘leader country’ in Eurasia” (Bahceli, 2001). Therefore, it can be concluded that these two radical parties do not really feel good about the idea of being in the EU. The EU represents the “Other” for them. Instead of being in the European Union, they want Turkey to be in another Turkic-Islamic Union and see their group as better than other, similar groups such as the EU.

The following results can be predicted by the end of this study:

In general, the two major events may or may not have an impact on Euro-skepticism. If there is any impact, this impact might be classified as either negative or positive. Basically, it can be concluded that a favorable action from one organization may or may not change the attitude of the second organization.

If the change is in a positive way, it will indicate that these two EU decisions made an impact on Euro-skepticism and changed the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites toward the European Union in a positive way. (The null hypotheses will be rejected.) Arikan (2004) indicates that “the perceptions of a nation as to another nation’s image may fluctuate for various reasons during different periods. For a nation, an inspiring significant other may transform into a threatening other and vice versa. For instance, the west was a major threatening external other to Turks in reference to its culture and territory for centuries, yet it was perceived as an external inspiring other during the process of the formation of the new state system and national identity by the

Kemalist elites.” Therefore, there is a possibility that these two milestone events in the Turkey-EU relationship may have a positive impact on the Euro-skepticism of these two nationalist and religious parties’ political elites. If the result is positive, it will be concluded that, unlike the other studies related to social identity theory, inter-group relationships do not always function in a negative way.

If the impact is in a negative way, it will indicate that these two EU decisions made an impact on Euro-skepticism and changed the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites toward the European Union in a negative way. (The null hypotheses will be rejected.) If the result is negative, it will be concluded that inter-group relationships in this case function very much in the same way as in other studies related to Social Identity Theory. Laboratory studies that use SIT’s minimal group paradigm have demonstrated that simply assigning an individual to a group is sufficient to generate in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Even explicitly random assignment of individuals to different groups has caused discrimination against out-groups and increased intra-group cooperation and cohesion (Billing, Tajfel, 1973; Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980).

If there is not any impact, the null hypotheses will be accepted.

Specifically, the two major events might have a different impact on trust-based, nationalism-based and religion-based Euro-skepticism. For instance, while these two EU decisions may have a positive impact on trust-based euro-skepticism, there may not

be any impact or there may be a negative impact on nationalism-based and religion-based Euro-skepticism since the ideologies are difficult to change.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology:

Research Methodology

This dissertation investigated whether the decisions of the EU toward Turkey's EU membership have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites. December 17, 2004 and October 3, 2005 were used as two major events to measure this impact on two major nationalist and religious parties.

A content analysis method was used in this study. The changes in the content and occurrences of these two conservative parties' statements on trust-based and ideology-based Euro-skepticism were analyzed over time. Two major EU decisions about Turkey's membership were selected as critical discourse moments to analyze the possible changes over time, particularly in reference to before, during, and after these two events. Both latent and manifest content analyses of these parties' official statements were employed to understand the impact of the EU's decisions on the Euro-skepticism of these two political parties.

Content analysis is one of the most valuable research techniques in the social sciences. Krippendorff (1981) explains content analysis as a technique that seeks to understand data not as a collection of physical events but as symbolic phenomena and to approach their analysis unobtrusively. Content analysis is any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text. Content analysis (also called textual analysis) is a standard methodology in the social sciences on the subject of communication content. Babbie (2003) defines it as “the study of recorded human communications, such as books, web sites, paintings and laws.” Holsti (1969) makes a broad definition of content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.” According to Holsti’s definition, content analysis is not limited within the domain of textual analysis, it also may be applied to other areas such as coding student drawings (Wheelock, Haney, & Bebell, 2000) or coding of actions in videotaped studies (Stigler, Gonzales, Kawanaka, Knoll, & Serreno, 1999). It is a popular research tool that is used to determine the presence of specified words, concepts or phrases within any texts or sets of texts such as articles, books, speeches, media sources, or historical documents. Content analysis allows us to quantify and analyze the presence, meanings, and relationships of certain words, concepts or phrases, then make inferences about the messages within the texts. Basically content analysis gives the researchers an opportunity to analyze the data obtained from archival records, documents, and the mass media. For example, by content analysis a researcher can analyze the letters, diaries, newspaper articles, films, TV and radio shows, live

reportage, and minutes of meetings (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Lasswell (1965) formulated the basic question to be raised by researchers using content analysis: ‘Who says what, to whom, how, and with what effect.’ Basically, content analysis can be defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1952; GAO, 1996; and Weber, 1990).

Naisbitt (1984) analyzed the social, economic and political currents in America as a basis for his forecasts of new trends. He applied content analysis on more than 2 million articles about local events published over a twelve year period in local newspapers throughout the country. The results showed that California, Florida, Washington, Colorado and Connecticut are the homes of the greatest number of social events.

In another study, researchers analyzed editorials from 10 important newspapers. These newspapers were selected from different countries such as the United States, England, France, Germany, Russia/the Soviet Union for the period 1890-1949. Editorials on the 1st and the 15th day of each month were coded based on the presence of 416 key symbols, 210 ideological references such as equality, democracy, and communism and 206 geographical terms such as names of countries and international organizations. The coders scored each symbol as present and recorded the attitudes expressed toward that symbol in one of these three categories: approval, disapproval, or neutrality. When the same symbol appeared more than once in an editorial it was not

counted a second time. The data, collected from the content analysis of 19,553 editorials, was used to trace changing attitudes and foci of public attention (Pool, 1981).

Timetable:

The timetable will start on July 25, 2004 and end on February 25, 2006. It is going to be 145 days before and after each major event.

145 Days before	145 Days before
17 December, 2004	03 October, 2005
145 Days after	145 Days after

In this way, I can make certain that I will not miss any important data between July 25, 2004 and February 25, 2006. By recording data from 145 days before and after each major event, I will maintain consistency in my research.

The timetable was established as follows:

General Period for the December 17, 2004 event

Before the decision: July 25, 2004 - December 16, 2004

During the decision: December 17, 2004

After the decision: December 18, 2004 – May 10, 2005

General Period for the October 03, 2005

Before the decision; May 11, 2005– October 02, 2005

During the decision; October 03, 2005

After the decision; October 04, 2005 – February 25, 2006

Data Collection:

The data mainly was collected from two Pro-MHP and Pro-SP newspapers such as Ortadogu and Milli Gazete.

By doing a content analysis, I looked at the frequency and content of each party's statements. The frequency of these statements was indicated as a percentage of all EU statements of each party. Since I am measuring the Euro-skepticism, my main focus was on the negative EU statements. However, to see a broader picture and to increase the reliability of the study, I have paid attention on the positive, neutral, and ambiguous EU statements as well. The technique of content analysis helped me to classify and analyze each party's statements and statement strategies. They were classified as negative (nationalism-based, religion-based, trust-based and other negatives), neutral, positive, and ambiguous statements. At the end, I also compared and contrasted the parties' views about the EU and toward each other before, during, and after the two major events.

Sampling Frame:

As known, once a researcher defines the population of interest, he or she needs to draw a sample that represents that population adequately. The sample can only be selected from a sampling frame comprised of a complete listing of sampling units.

Basically, the sampling frame should include all of the sampling units in the given population (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Since this study is only focusing on the party elites of SP and MHP, my population of interest was the Central Office. Each reachable individual of the Central Office was also a part of the sample of this study. The Central Office is the main decision-making mechanism of the party and all the other organs of the party have to obey the rules, regulations, decisions, and instructions of the Central Office. Basically, the Central Office consists of the party elites. The following organizational structure of the parties and the justifications explain the criteria based on which I have chosen the sample of this study.

The Organizational Structure of the Parties

In general, both parties have similar organizational structures. It has been presented as follows:

The Organizational Structure is comprised of three different Organs which include:

I- Primary Organs (Main Organization)

II- Supplementary Organs

III- Agencies at Home and Abroad

I-) Primary Organs (Main Organization)

1-) The Central Office

- a-) Grand Congress
- b-) Chairman
- c-) General Executive Committee
- d-) Council of Chairmanship
- e-) High Discipline Committee
- f-) Party Advisory Assembly

2-) *Organization in the Cities*

- a-) Congress
- b-) Chairman
- c-) Executive Committee
- d-) Discipline Committee

3-) *Organization in the Towns*

- a-) Congress
- b-) Chairman
- c-) Executive Committee

4-) *Organization in the Districts (Smaller than towns)*

- a-) Chairman
- b-) Executive Committee

5-) *Groups*

- a-) Party's Group in the TGNA
- b-) Party's Groups in the General Assemblies in cities
- c-) Party's Groups in the Assemblies of municipalities

II-) Supplementary Organs

1-) Ladies' Clubs

2-) Youth Clubs

3-) Other supplementary organs, which are established by the decisions of the General Executive Committee

III-) Agencies at Home and Abroad

1-) Party Agencies at home

a-) Party's agencies in villages and in the subdivisions of cities and towns

b-) Party's agencies in the Electoral Districts

2-) The Party Agencies Abroad

a-) The Party's agencies in foreign states where a considerable number of Turkish citizens live

b-) The Party's agencies, which are open in the states where information agencies are needed for the promotion of Turkey

This research focused only on the Central Office from the Primary Organs (Main Organization). The Central Office is the main decision making mechanism of the party and all the other organs of the party have to obey the rules, regulations, decisions and instructions of the Central Office. Therefore, it can be easily said that the Central

Office is the most representative organ of the entire Party as a whole. It has six different branches such as:

- Grand Congress*
- Chairman*
- General Executive Committee*
- Council of Chairmanship*
- High Discipline Committee*
- Party Advisory Assembly*

The Grand Congress was eliminated from this list and was not taken into consideration because of several reasons. Before explaining these reasons, some general information about the Grand Congress will be helpful to understand why this organ of the party was not considered during this research.

The Grand Congress is comprised of elected and natural members.

Natural Members (Delegates) are comprised of :

- Chairman of the Party*
- Members of the General Executive Committee*
- *Members of the High Discipline Committee*
- Ministers and MP's, who are members of the party*
- Founding members of the party*

Elected Members' (Delegates) number is twice the number of Parliamentarians in the TGNA. Each city's party congress elects twice as many delegates as the number

of parliamentarians representing that city. The natural members do not participate in the election of delegates (The statutes of MHP and SP).

The Grand Congress will be eliminated because of the following reasons:

- The Chairman of the party under natural members of the Grand Congress overlaps with the Chairman of the party under the Central Office
- The Members of the General Executive Committee under natural members of the Grand Congress overlap with the Members of the Executive Committee under the Central Office
- The Members of the High Discipline Committee under natural members of the Grand Congress overlap with the Members of the Executive Committee under the Central Office
- Since both parties were out of the Parliament after the last election, they neither have ministers nor MP's
- Some names on the list of the Founding Members overlap with the names under the Chairman of the Party, the Members of the General Executive Committee, the members of the High Disciplines Committee of the Central Office. The rest of the names on the list of the Founding Members were not studied since these names were not as functional as the other names and no longer publicized by the media.
- Since the elected members are not the primary people for the Central Office, they are not as functional as the natural members are. They are also rarely to be seen in the media. Therefore, they were not included in this study.

The Party Advisory Assembly was eliminated from this list since neither of these two parties has a formally established Advisory Assembly.

After eliminating the Grand Congress and Party Advisory Assembly, my main focus was on *the Chairman, General Executive Committee, Council of Chairmanship, and High Discipline Committee* under the Central Office. Therefore, they were considered as the sample for this research. The list of the names and positions can be seen from Appendix A and the official web pages, <http://www.sp.org.tr/> (Official Web Page of SP) and <http://www.mhp.org.tr> (Official Web Page of MHP), of two political parties.

Coding:

The data was coded as follows:

The method of content analysis helped me to identify the negative (religious, nationalistic, trust-based, and other negatives), positive, neutral, and ambiguous statements from the texts.

Column A:

The statements (observations) were entered to SPSS and numerated under the “TypeofStatement” column A.

The first column was used to code each statement as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. The statements were coded as follows:

Religion= 1

Nationalism= 2

Trust= 3

Other Negatives= 4 (These first 4 statements represent the negative statements.)

Neutral= 5

Positive= 6

Ambiguous= 7

Column B:

Column B displays the date (month/day/year) of each statement and helps to mark the time that each statement was said or implemented.

Column C:

Column C displays the before, during, and after of each event.

Before the first event = 1

Before the second event= 4

During the first event = 2

During the second event= 5

After the first event= 3

After the second event= 6

Column D:

Column D represents the political party, and each political party was coded differently. SP was coded as 1 and MHP was coded as 2.

Column E:

Column E displays the official level, and two different levels were observed under this column. The leader of the parties was coded as 1, and the other elites around the party leader were coded as 2.

Column F:

The final Column F contains the type data. Basically, it indicates how the views of the party elite were distributed. The Press Briefings were coded as 1, the speeches and messages were coded as 2, and if the data type was undetermined it was coded as 3.

Coding Rules for the Column A

The statement was coded as:

Religion=1

If the statement delivers a message that EU membership will harm Turkey's Islamic values, Islamic Identity, or Islamic culture and expresses that the EU is a Christian club, anti-Muslim and anti-Islam, or,

If the statement delivers a message that disagrees with existing and many proposed future issues regarding Islam (religion).

The support of D-8 was also considered as opposition to the EU as a Christian Club.

Nationalism=2

If the statement delivers a message that EU membership will harm Turkey's national values, national identity, national culture, national interest, national sovereignty, nation state, national unity, state entirety, state dignity and expresses that the EU is anti-Turkish and an external enemy, or,

If the statement delivers a message that disagrees with existing and many proposed future issues regarding nationalism.

Trust=3

If the statement expresses any doubt about the EU's willingness and honesty in accepting Turkey as a member, or any distrust of the EU and the EU's double standards towards Turkey.

Other Negatives=4

If the statement delivers any message that is neither Religion-based, Nationalism-based, nor Trust-based Euro-skepticism related, or,

If the statement is a combination of Religion-based, Nationalism-based and Trust-based Euro-skepticism, basically if there is more than one meaning.

Neutral=5

If the statement delivers any message that is neither negative, positive, nor ambiguous.

Positive=6

If the statement delivers any message that is positive about the EU.

Ambiguous=7

If the statement is open to two or more interpretations or having more than one possible meaning, so that it is not clear how the sentence will be coded.

If the statement is neither negative, neutral, nor positive.

Reliability of the study:

At the end of the coding of each related statement towards the EU, 50 randomly selected statements were coded by two independent coders. The results were compared with the original coding to determine the reliability of this research.

Since three observers (the researcher and two independent coders) became involved in this research, Inter-Rater (Inter-Observer or Inter-Coder) Reliability is the best technique to assess the degree to which different raters/observers give consistent estimates of the same phenomenon. Inter-rater reliability is the commonly used term for the extent to which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same conclusion (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, Bracken, 2004). Tinsley and Weiss (1975, 2000) indicate that inter-coder (inter-rater) agreement is the most specific term for the type of consistency required in content analysis. Kolbe and Burnett (1991) note that “inter-judge reliability is often perceived as the standard measure of research quality. High levels of disagreement among judges suggest weaknesses in research methods, including the possibility of poor operational definitions, categories, and judge trainings.”

Whenever we use human beings as part of our measurement procedure, we have to worry about whether the results we get are reliable or consistent. To make sure that this is the case, Inter-Rater Reliability will be used as a statistical technique. As Neuendorf (2002) indicates, “given that a goal of content analysis is to identify and record relatively objective (or at least intersubjective) characteristics of messages, reliability is paramount. Without the establishment of reliability, content analysis

measures are useless.” Therefore, researchers who use content analysis should carefully consider inter-rater reliability.

There are two important ways to estimate Inter-Rater Reliability:


If the measurement consists of categories, the percentage of agreement between the raters will be calculated.

If the measure is a continuous one, the correlation between the ratings of the two observers will be calculated (Trochim, 2006.)

In this research, since the coding was done at a nominal level, the percentage of agreement between raters was calculated to get the Inter-rater reliability. SPSS also was used to calculate Cohen’s Kappa. We first select “Analyze,” “Descriptive Statistics,” “Crosstabs” on the menus, then click on “Statistics” to bring up a dialog screen, and click on the check box for “Kappa.” This process can be viewed in Table 7. (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, Bracken, 2004). Next, we select an appropriate minimum acceptable level of reliability for the index or indices to be used. “Coefficients of .90 or greater are nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in most situations, and .70 may be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices. Higher criteria should be used for indices known to be liberal (i.e., percent agreement) and lower criteria should be used for indices known to be more conservative (Cohen’s Kappa, Scott’s pi, and Krippendorff’s alpha).” (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, Bracken, 2004). Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that kappa values from 0.41-0.60 are moderate, and those values above 0.60 are substantial. Kappa is a useful statistic when one is concerned that the percent-

agreement statistic can be artificially inflated because of the fact that most observations fall into a single category (Stemler, 2004).

Table 7: Calculation of Inter-rater Reliability



(Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, Bracken, 2004).

Hypotheses Testing:

The hypotheses were tested by using **Two Sample Z-Test** to compare **Two Independent Proportions**. The formula is as follows:

$$Z = \frac{P_1 - P_2}{\sqrt{[P_c(1 - P_c) / n_1] + [P_c(1 - P_c) / n_2]}}$$

(Hawkes, Marsh, 2005)

$$P_1 = X_1 / n_1$$

$$P_2 = X_2 / n_2$$

$$P_c = (X_1 + X_2) / (n_1 + n_2)$$

If Z is 1.96 or higher, then the difference of means is significant at the .05 level. In that case, the null hypotheses were rejected (Zhou, Fielding, Silverman, Tempany, 2003).

CHAPTER 4

The findings of the study will be explained in two different sections. In the first section, the hypotheses will be tested by using the Two Sample Z-Test formula to compare Two Independent Proportions. Cross tabulation will be run to get the appropriate numbers to plug into this formula. This table will help to show the number of different types of statements, negative (religion-based, nationalism-based, trust-based and other negatives), neutral, positive, and ambiguous, before, during, and after each major event. After calculating the Z-value for each hypothesis based on each party and each event separately, we will be able to accept or reject our null hypotheses.

The second section is going to consist of the explanation part of the SPSS sheets. Using descriptive statistics will allow us to analyze the “Type of statements”, “Party Official Level”, and “Type of Data”. Each Party’s reaction to two different major decisions from the EU will be explained separately. For instance, “frequencies” is one of the simplest, yet one of the most functional commands of descriptive statistics. It is one of SPSS’ commands in which it is possible to access certain graphs such as bar charts, pie charts, and histograms. Besides frequency tables, section two will also consist of some bar charts to create a visual display of frequency information (George &

Mallery, 2001). Using bar charts help to interpret the percentage of different types of statements, the percentages of how many statements were said before, during and after each major event, the percentages of the statements that were said by the leader of the party and the other elites around the party leader, and the percentages of the manner in which these statements were delivered to the public. Studying charts right next to the frequency tables will also help us to visualize the information in these frequency tables and will make it more meaningful.

Why is this Study Reliable?

50 randomly selected statements were coded by two independent coders. First of all, the statements of MHP and SP were combined and the total number of 2553 was divided by 50 ($2553/50=51$). Every other 51st statement was selected to be coded by the researcher and two independent coders. The results of the two independent coders were compared with the researcher's original coding to determine the reliability of this research.

Since three observers (the researcher and other two independent coders) were involved in this research, Inter-Rater (Inter-Observer or Inter-Coder) Reliability was the best technique to assess the degree to which different raters/observers gave consistent estimates of the same phenomenon.

SPSS was used to calculate Cohen's Kappa. Coefficients of .90 or greater are nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in most situations, and .70 may be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices (Lombard, Snyder-Dutch,

Bracken, 2004). Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that kappa values from 0.41-0.60 are moderate, and those values above 0.60 are substantial.

Table 8: Agreement between Researcher and Coder1

	Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Measure of Agreement Kappa	.864	.057	11.294	.000
N of Valid Cases	50			

Table 9: Agreement Between Researcher and Coder2

	Value	Asymp. Std. Error(a)	Approx. T(b)	Approx. Sig.
Measure of Agreement Kappa	.837	.061	11.094	.000
N of Valid Cases	50			

Since the results are .86 and .83, we can say that this study is reliable.

Hypotheses Testing:

Main Hypotheses

H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism,

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism,

H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism,

H4 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites,

Each of these hypotheses will be tested based on each party (SP,MHP) and each major decision from the EU (17 December, 2004 and 3 October, 2005).

Hypotheses Testing for MHP

Table 10: Types of Statements: Before, During and After each event Crosstabulation (MHP)

Before, During, And After Each Event						
Types of Statements	Before 1st Event	After 1st Event	Before 2nd Event	During 2nd Event	After 2nd Event	Total
Religion	16	19	2	2	4	43
Nationalism	127	156	97	5	75	460
Trust	53	40	34	6	20	153
Other Negatives	51	77	34	3	21	186
Neutral	33	6	10	0	8	57
Positive	2	0	0	0	0	2
Ambiguous	28	18	18	1	6	71
Total	310	316	195	17	134	972

(No statement was found during the first event, 17 December, 2004)

The appropriate numbers are inserted into the Two Sample Z-Test Formula. If z is 1.96 or higher, then the difference of means is significant at the .05 level. In that case, the null hypotheses will be rejected.

Two Sample Z-Test Formula:

$$z = \left[\frac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{p_c(1-p_c)}{n_1} + \frac{p_c(1-p_c)}{n_2}}} \right] \quad p_c = \frac{n_1}{n_1 + n_2} \hat{p}_1 + \frac{n_2}{n_1 + n_2} \hat{p}_2$$

(Hawkes, Marsh, 2005)

Table 11: Hypothesis Testing for Nationalist Action Party (MHP)

Hypothesis Testing for Nationalist Action Party (MHP)	
First Event	Second Event
H1	H1
$P_1 = 53/310 = 0.170$	$P_1 = 34/195 = 0.174$
$P_2 = 40/316 = 0.126$	$P_2 = 20/134 = 0.149$
$P_c = (53+40)/(310+316) = 93/626 = 0.148$	$P_c = (34+20)/(195+134) = 54/329 = 0.164$
$z = 1.561$	$z = 0.604$
H2	H2
$P_1 = 127/310 = 0.409$	$P_1 = 97/195 = 0.497$
$P_2 = 146/316 = 0.493$	$P_2 = 75/134 = 0.559$
$P_c = (127+156)/(310+316) = 283/626 = 0.452$	$P_c = (97+75)/(195+134) = 172/329 = 0.522$
$z = -2.111$	$z = -1.110$

H3

$$P_1 = 16/310 = 0.051$$

$$P_2 = 19/316 = 0.060$$

$$P_c = (16+19)/(310+316) = 35/626 = 0.055$$

$$z = -0.463$$

H4

$$P_1 = 247/310 = 0.796$$

$$P_2 = 292/316 = 0.924$$

$$P_c = (247+292)/(310+316) = 539/626 = 0.861$$

$$z = -4.602$$

H3

$$P_1 = 2/195 = 0.010$$

$$P_2 = 4/134 = 0.029$$

$$P_c = (2+4)/(195+134) = 6/329 = 0.018$$

$$z = -1.305$$

H4

$$P_1 = 167/195 = 0.856$$

$$P_2 = 120/134 = 0.895$$

$$P_c = (167+120)/(195+134) = 287/329 = 0.872$$

$$z = -1.044$$

For the first event;

H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism.

Since z is 1.561 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism.

Since z is -2.111 and higher than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is significant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be rejected (Euro-skepticism increased).

H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have

any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism.

Since z is -0.463 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H4 *The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites,*

Since z is -4.602 and higher than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 Level, and thus the null hypothesis will be rejected (Euro-skepticism increased).

For the second event;

H1 *The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism.*

Since z is 0.604 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H2 *The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism.*

Since z is -1.110 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H3 *The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on religion based Euro-skepticism.*

Since z is -1.305 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

***H4_**The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites.*

Since z is -1.044 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

Hypotheses Testing for SP

Table 12: Types of Statements: Before, during and after each event Crosstabulation (SP)

Before, During, And After Each Event							
Types of Statements	Before 1st Event	During 1st Event	After 1st Event	Before 2nd Event	During 2nd Event	After 2nd Event	Total
Religion	43	0	58	35	0	37	173
Nationalism	133	0	199	127	1	99	559
Trust	54	1	45	53	1	34	188
Other Negatives	111	1	89	53	4	80	338
Neutral	46	3	29	17	0	24	119
Positive	4	0	2	0	0	0	6
Ambiguous	54	0	71	42	2	29	198
Total	445	5	493	327	8	303	1581

The same **Two Sample Z-Test Formula** above will be used to test the hypotheses for SP too. The appropriate numbers are inserted into the two sample z-Test formula. If z is 1.96 or higher, then the difference of means is significant at the .05 level. In that case, the null hypotheses will be rejected.

Table 13: Hypothesis Testing for Felicity Party (SP)

Hypothesis Testing for Felicity Party (SP)	
First Event H1	Second Event H1
$P_1 = 54/445 = 0.121$	$P_1 = 53/327 = 0.162$
$P_2 = 45/493 = 0.091$	$P_2 = 34/303 = 0.112$
$P_c = (54+45) / (445+493) = 99/938 = 0.105$	$P_c = (53+34) / (327+303) = 87/630 = 0.138$

$$z = -1.496$$

H2

$$P_1 = 133/445 = 0.298$$

$$P_2 = 199/493 = 0.403$$

$$P_c = (133+199)/(445+493) = 332/938 = 0.353$$

$$z = -3.350$$

H3

$$P_1 = 43/445 = 0.096$$

$$P_2 = 58/493 = 0.117$$

$$P_c = (43+58)/(445+493) = 101/938 = 0.107$$

$$z = -1.036$$

H4

$$P_1 = 341/445 = 0.776$$

$$P_2 = 391/493 = 0.793$$

$$P_c = (341+391)/(445+493) = 732/938 = 0.780$$

$$z = -0.990$$

$$z = 1.812$$

H2

$$P_1 = 127/327 = 0.388$$

$$P_2 = 99/303 = 0.326$$

$$P_c = (127+99)/(327+303) = 226/630 = 0.358$$

$$z = 1.611$$

H3

$$P_1 = 35/327 = 0.107$$

$$P_2 = 37/303 = 0.122$$

$$P_c = (35+37)/(327+303) = 72/630 = 0.114$$

$$z = -0.594$$

H4

$$P_1 = 268/327 = 0.819$$

$$P_2 = 250/303 = 0.825$$

$$P_c = (268+250)/(327+303) = 518/630 = 0.822$$

$$z = -0.180$$

For the first event;

H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism,

Since z is -1.496 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism.

Since z is -3.350 and higher than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is significant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be rejected (Euro-skepticism increased).

***H3** _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism,*

Since z is -1.036 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

***H4** _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites,*

Since z is -0.990 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

For the second Event;

***H1** _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism,*

Since z is 1.812 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted. (It is significant at the 0.10 level, 1.64 and therefore there is a decrease in Trust-based Euro-skepticism).

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism,

Since z is 1.611 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism,

Since z is -0.594 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

H4 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites,

Since z is -0.180 and lower than 1.96 (two tailed test), the difference of means is insignificant at the .05 level, and thus the null hypothesis will be accepted.

As we observed from the hypotheses testing, the two major events, in both political parties, did not have any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. On the other hand, only the first event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of both political parties and on the overall Euro-skepticism of MHP. This difference in the parties' reactions to decisions made by the European Union will be discussed in the following chapter. Essentially, the two major favorable

decisions from the EU either did not change the Euro-skepticism of political party's elites or the change occurred in a negative way. The hypotheses were tested on two different parties and on two different events as before and after. Since we had 4 general hypotheses, the hypotheses testing occurred 16 times in total. If we look at the Hypotheses testing tables, we can see that 3 of them showed a negative impact and 13 of them showed no impact at all. No positive impact was found at the 0.05 level. Only one of them was significant at the 0.10 level and it showed that there was a decrease in Trust based Euro-skepticism. None of the tests showed a positive impact or decrease in Euro-skepticism at the 0.05 level even though the decisions from the EU were favorable decisions. If so, why didn't they decrease Euro-skepticism? This question can be answered by looking at the issue from different perspectives. The decrease of Euro-skepticism might not have occurred because of several reasons. The answer to that question will be associated with the Social Identity Theory, the fact that the two parties are peripheral, and the stringent EU requirements regarding Turkey's flexibility on many sensitive issues such as Cyprus, the retrial of Abdullah Ocalan, the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Seminary, etc. These details will be covered in the following chapter.


Explanation of the descriptive parts of SPSS sheets;

MHP

Frequencies

Table 14: Frequency Table of Types of Statements (MHP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Religion	43	4.4	4.4	4.4
Nationalism	460	47.3	47.3	51.7
Trust	153	15.7	15.7	67.5
Other Negatives	186	19.1	19.1	86.6
Neutral	57	5.9	5.9	92.5
Positive	2	0.2	0.2	92.7
Ambiguous	71	7.3	7.3	100
Total	972	100	100	

Figure 3: Types of Statements (MHP)

Since the Nationalist Action Party embraces Turkish nationalism, nationalism-based statements have the highest percentage at 47.3 percent. As discussed in the literature review, the elites of MHP have argued that EU has several aims on Turkey.

They became very concerned about the perceived tricks that the EU played on Turkey. According to the elites of this nationalist party, the EU was trying to break the national unity of Turkey with the idea of a mosaic and multicultural society, promote the ethnic nationalism including PKK for the 'Federalization of Turkey', and move Turkey out of Cyprus and the Aegean to weaken its geopolitical advantage, etc. The party elites almost did not have any positive views towards the European Union. Therefore, the percentage of the positive statements is only 0.2.


The second lowest percentage belongs to the religion-based statements with 4.4 percent. Since the party has a strong support for the Secularist state, religion is a secondary issue for the Nationalist Action Party, and this can be observed from the statements of this political party's elites. Other negative statements have the second highest percentage with 19.1 percent. Nationalist Action Party's elites also show mistrust toward the European Union, and trust-based statements have the third highest percentage with 15.7 percent. Their trust-based statements always expressed doubt about the EU's willingness and honesty in accepting Turkey as a member. Distrust of the EU itself and its double standards toward Turkey can easily be observed from the discourses of MHP's elites. For instance, the leader of MHP said that "It will be understood that EU does not see Turkey as a partner that has the equal rights that the others have" Ortadoğu, (2004a). Devlet Bahçeli also said that "EU showed one more time that it is not sincere towards Turkey and Turkey's EU membership is unacceptable for them" Ortadoğu, (2004b). These types of statements from MHP's elites simply indicate their trust-based Euro-skepticism.

On the other hand, the difference between the percentages of neutral and ambiguous statements is fairly small. The percentage of ambiguous and neutral statements is close one to another with 7.3 and 5.9.

Table 15: Before, During and After each event (MHP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Before 1st Event	310	31.9	31.9	31.9
After 1st Event	316	32.5	32.5	64.4
Before 2nd Event	195	20.1	20.1	84.5
During 2nd Event	17	1.7	1.7	86.2
After 2nd Event	134	13.8	13.8	100
Total	972	100	100	

Figure 4: Before, During and After each event (MHP)



Almost 64 percent of the statements of the Nationalist Action Party were said before and after the first event. It is clear that the number of statements had a drastic

decrease with the second event. It can also be concluded that the first event had more impact on this political party. That is why there is a big difference between the first and second event in terms of the number of statements. While the percentage of statements that belong to the first event is 64, the percentage of statements that belong to the second event is only 35. The decrease in the number of statements with the second event might also be an indicator of the decrease in Euro-skepticism.

For instance, if we look at Table 10, we can clearly see that there is a marked decrease in the nationalism-based, religion-based, trust-based and other negative statements. Even though the hypothesis testing results of the second event did not show any significant impact at the 0.05 level, we should not ignore the fact that the Euro-skepticism of these political elite might be fading away or that the reason might be that the elites may have stopped talking about the EU. We can make a good judgment on that perplexing subject by looking at the other statements (positive, neutral and ambiguous) besides the negative statements (trust-based, nationalism-based, religion-based, and other negatives). If there is no increase in positive statements, it is more likely that the elites stopped talking about the EU. Then we can easily say that Euro-skepticism is not fading away.


For example, if we look at Table 10, the first event, we can see that the total number of nationalism-based statements is 283. By looking at the same table we also see that the total number of nationalism-based statements for the second event decreased to 177. Can we conclude that the reason of this decrease is because of the decrease in Euro-skepticism? To answer this question better, we can look at the change

in positive statements. If there is not an increase in positive statements, it is hard to say that Euro-skepticism is fading away. The reason might be because the elites are not talking much about the European Union anymore.

Table 16: The level of party official (MHP)

Level of Party Official	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Leader	652	67.1	67.1	67.1
Other Elites	320	32.9	32.9	100
Total	972	100	100	


Figure 5: The level of party official (MHP)



The leader of the Nationalist Action Party, Dr. Devlet Bahçeli, is the one who made most of the statements that belong to this party. 67.1 percent of the statements come from him. The percentage of statements that come from other party elites is only 32.9. This situation is exactly the opposite of the other party (SP). When we look at the SP's "level of party official" table, we can see that 68.8 percent of the statements have come from the other elites around the party leader. Only 31.2 percent of the statements come from the Party leader.

Table 17: The data type (MHP)

Data Type	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Press Briefings	448	46.1	46.1	46.1
Speeches and Messages	405	41.7	41.7	87.8
Undetermined	119	12.2	12.2	100
Total	972	100	100	

Figure 6: the data type (MHP)

The Party Elites of MHP mostly delivered their messages to the public by arranging press briefings in front of the media. 46.1 percent of their statements were delivered to the public through press briefings. Since media is the fastest way to reach the public, it is clear that MHP's political elite is aware of the practicality of the media. Therefore, MHP has its own newspaper, Ortadogu, which was used as a resource for collecting my data for these particular party elites. The second remarkable way for MHP elites to deliver their messages is speeches and messages with 41.7 percent.


SP

Frequencies

Table 18: Frequency Table of Types of Statements (SP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Religion	173	10.9	10.9	10.9
Nationalism	559	35.4	35.4	46.3
Trust	188	11.9	11.9	58.2
Other Negatives	338	21.4	21.4	79.6
Neutral	119	7.5	7.5	87.1
Positive	6	0.4	0.4	87.5
Ambiguous	198	12.5	12.5	100
Total	1581	100	100	


Figure 7: Types of Statements (SP)



Even though the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) is a Turkish Political Party that has a strong Islamist view, the religion-based statements are much less frequent than the nationalism-based statements (religion-based is 10.9% and nationalism-based is 35.4%). After the closure of two Islamist parties, Welfare Party and Virtue Party, by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001, Felicity Party made several changes in their policy on different issues. This could easily be one of the reasons why the party elites of SP avoided religion-based comments and more made nationalism-based criticism regarding Turkey's relationship with the European Union. Like Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Felicity Party (SP) also shows no sympathy toward the EU. The smallest percentage .4, positive statements, is proof of that statement. These small percentages of positive statements of both party's elites show us how skeptical they are about Turkey's EU membership process. There are so many different statements that prove SP's trust-based, nationalism-based, religion-based and other types of Euro-skepticism. For instance, one of the party officials said that "EU will never give Turkey a date to start for full membership negotiations" *Milli Gazete*, (2004a). Another party official also said that "EU will not give us a date in December" *Milli Gazete*, (2004b). Several hundred similar statements from the SP party elite show their different types of skepticism towards the EU.

Table 19: Before, during and after each event (SP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Before 1st Event	445	28.1	28.1	28.1
During 1st Event	5	0.3	0.3	28.5
After 1st Event	493	31.2	31.2	59.6
Before 2nd Event	327	20.7	20.7	80.3
During 2nd Event	8	0.5	0.5	80.8
After 2nd Event	303	19.2	19.2	100
Total	1581	100	100	


Figure 8: Before, during and after each event (SP)

Similar to MHP, SP also had been more affected by the first event. As seen, the number of statements shows a decrease with the second event. If we look at Table 12, we see that the number of nationalism-based statements of SP is 332 for the first event. This number decreased to 226. This is either because the Euro-skepticism of the party elite is fading away or the elites of the party stopped talking about the EU. To understand the truth, we can look at positive statements. If there is no increase in positive statements while nationalism-based negative statements were fading away, it is hard to say that Euro-skepticism is decreasing. The reason might be because the party elites do not talk about the EU anymore. The same discussion above (*before, during and after of each event for MHP*) can be applied to SP also.

Table 20: The level of party official (SP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Leader	494	31.2	31.2	31.2
Other Elites	1087	68.8	68.8	100
Total	1581	100	100	

Figure 9: The level of party official (SP)




Contrary to MHP, SP's statements came more from the other party elites than from the party leader. The Leader of the party has made fewer comments about the EU compared to the other elites. (68.8% vs. 31.2%).

Table 21: The data type (SP)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Press Briefings	594	37.6	37.6	37.6
Speeches and Messages	818	51.7	51.7	89.3
Undetermined	169	10.7	10.7	100
Total	1581	100	100	

Figure 10: the data type (SP)



In contradiction to MHP, SP mostly used speeches and messages to deliver their opinion about the European Union. Press briefings became secondary for these party elites.

CHAPTER 5

In order to obtain a better understanding of the findings of this study, this chapter will relate the findings of the study to the entire body of this dissertation.

This study achieved a group of objectives such as measuring the impact of the EU's decisions on trust-based, nationalism-based, and religion-based Euro-skepticism, measuring the impact of the EU's decisions on overall Euro-skepticism, and searching and investigating the reasons behind Euro-skepticism in detail by conducting content analysis on statements of two Turkish nationalist and religious peripheral parties' elites.

The study basically asked two important questions about Euro-skepticism and answered each question by testing four main hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on two different parties, the Nationalist Action Party and the Felicity Party. The following questions were answered by four different main hypotheses and each hypothesis tested by using the two sample z-Test formula:

Question #1 asked whether the decisions of the EU on December 17, 2004 and on October 3, 2005, have any impact on trust-based, nationalism-based and religion-based Euro-skepticism of two major nationalist and religious parties' elites.

Question #2 asked whether the decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites (Overall Euro-skepticism).

These questions were answered by testing the following hypotheses on two different parties and on two different events (before and after each event). Since we had 4 general hypotheses, the total hypothesis testing occurred 16 times. To be able to prove the hypotheses, the content analysis technique was used on the data that was collected from two newspapers: pro-MHP Ortadogu and pro-SP Milli Gazete. The data collected from one of the most circulated newspapers, mainstream-Milliyet, could not be used for this research because of possible redundancy. Basically the same data that Milliyet had about SP and MHP was also available on the other two newspapers.

Overview of Significant Findings

It will be meaningful to look at the main hypotheses before explaining the results of the study.

H1 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism,

H2 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism,

H3 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism,

H4 _The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership do not have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites,

Findings of MHP for the first event showed that:

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did have** an impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism (Euro-skepticism increased in a negative way).*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did have** an impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites (Euro-skepticism increased in a negative way.)*

Findings of MHP for the second event showed that:

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites*

Table 22: Hypotheses Testing for MHP (YES/NO)

	Hypotheses Testing for MHP	
	1 st EVENT	2 nd EVENT
H1	NO	NO
H2	YES	NO
H3	NO	NO
H4	YES	NO

Findings of SP for the first event showed that:

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did have** an impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism (Euro-skepticism increased in a negative way).*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites.*

Findings of SP for the second event showed that:

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on trust-based Euro-skepticism. (Skepticism decreased at the 0.10 level)*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on nationalism-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on religion-based Euro-skepticism.*

*The decisions of the EU in regards to Turkey's EU membership **did not** have any impact on the attitudes of Euro-skeptical Turkish Political Elites.*

Table 23: Hypotheses Testing for SP (YES/NO)

	Hypotheses Testing for SP	
	1 st EVENT	2 nd EVENT
H1	NO	NO
H2	YES	NO
H3	NO	NO
H4	NO	NO

The findings show that the two decisions by the EU did not have any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. Only the first event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of both political parties and overall Euro-skepticism of the MHP. The Hypotheses testing was on two different parties and on two different events as before and after. Since there were 4 general hypotheses, the total hypotheses testing occurred 16 times. The findings above show that 3 of them had a negative impact and 13 of them had no impact at all. No positive impact was found at

the 0.05 level. Only one of them showed significance at the 0.10 level. The results showed that the decisions of the European Union either did not change the Euro-skepticism or if there was a change it was in a negative way. None of the tests showed a positive impact or decrease in Euro-skepticism even though the decisions from EU were positive. If so, then why didn't they have any positive impact on Euro-skepticism?

Implications

The first answer to the previous question can be associated with the Social Identity Theory. As explained in the literature review section of this dissertation, group membership creates in-group/self-categorization and enhancement in ways that favor the in-group at the expense of the out-group (TCW, 2004). "Minimal Group Studies" that were conducted by Tajfel and Turner (1986) showed that the mere act of individuals categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favoritism. After they categorize themselves as group members, individuals seek to create positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from an out-group on some valued dimension. This theory is a response to several experiments conducted by Tajfel and his colleagues demonstrating that individuals attempt to maximize the differences between their group and other groups, even at the cost of in-group rewards (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Billing, 1974; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). SIT is based on the assumption that inter-group

perceptions and conflicts arise because groups attempt to maintain distinctiveness from other groups (Cable, Welbourne, 1994). If group discrimination, favoritism, or prejudice is present in these two religious and nationalist parties, the favorable decisions of the EU will not matter, and there will be no decrease in Euro-skepticism. Otherwise, we need to look for another reason to answer this question.

Since its inception, Social Identity Theory has mainly focused on inter-group phenomena in the context of large scale social categories and demographic groups. It has paid less attention to small groups and intra-group phenomena. In the last ten years, all this has changed, and social identity researchers have increasingly applied the principles of SIT to organizational contexts (Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001). As explained in the literature review, SIT was applied to a wide range of fields at the national and organizational level but, there is a lack of research that applies this theory at the international level.

Applying this theory on two different national (SP, MHP) and supra-national (EU) organizations is one of the unique sides of this research. Similar to Flockhart's (2005) study, this dissertation also is an example of inter-group phenomena in the context of large scale social categories and demographic groups. Flockhart explains why Europeanization is so differently perceived by masses and by the elites in Denmark. "The explanation is based on a conceptualization of mass and elite as two distinct social groups, which have been differently constructed, and which are undergoing different self-and other categorization process, leading to very different

conceptions of interest and political preferences, and hence different views on the desirability of Europeanization” (Flockhart, 2005). In my study, if the reason why the EU’s favorable decisions did not decrease Euro-skepticism is in-group vs. out-group phenomenon, then the Felicity Party (SP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) vs. European Union (EU) case helps us to understand how the Social Identity Theory can be applied on the inter-group discrimination and might create serious international problems. If the answer to this question is in the same vein as SIT, then we can conclude that this study applied Social Identity Theory on an inter-group phenomenon at the international level. The results of this study showed that even though the decisions from the EU were positive, they either did not decrease Euro-skepticism or the change came out in a negative way. Therefore, we can conclude that like the other studies related to Social Identity Theory, inter-group relationships are very much the same, even at the international level. Laboratory studies that use SIT’s minimal group paradigm have demonstrated that simply assigning an individual to a group is sufficient to generate in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Even explicit random assignment of individuals to different groups has caused discrimination against out-groups and increased intra-group cooperation and cohesion (Billing, Tajfel, 1973; Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980).

The second answer to that question could be associated with being a peripheral party. Conducting research on the peripheral parties is another contribution of this study. This way, an opportunity is created to compare and contrast the findings

with a similar study that was conducted on the core parties (Arikan, 2004), and to show how these radical parties responded to the EU membership project of Turkey once they were core and now that they became peripheral. This comparison will be especially valid for the case of MHP since it is the common party in our studies. As discussed in the literature review section of this study, core political parties with a role in governance seldom embrace Euro-skeptic positions. In the first place, such parties are, in effect, charged with bringing their countries in compliance with the *acquis*, and cannot undermine the prevailing consensus on the “return to Europe.” Furthermore, parties in power are responsible for the continuation and implementation of the reform package that involves unpopular social and economic policies, so that the conditionality associated with accession has an instrumental value as justification for the reform. (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2002).

Parties in opposition, on the other hand, appear to have more incentives to articulate Euro-skeptic views as a means to differentiate the political space and make inroads in the competition for power (Bielasiak, 2004). Eventually, the anti-Europe position is most frequently advanced by peripheral parties. Therefore, comparing these three types of political parties discussed earlier, it becomes evident that the level of Euro-skepticism gradually increases going from ruling parties (lowest level) to opposition parties to peripheral parties (highest level). (Ruling and Opposition parties are in the parliament; Peripheral Parties are not in the Parliament.) Table 3 shows the characteristics of the Euro-skeptics’ Parties as proof of this ranking. Basically, the evidence that lies in the prevalence of extra parliamentary parties in the Euro-skeptic

policy space confirms that the anti-Europe position is most frequently advanced by peripheral parties (extra parliamentary parties). Parties closer to the government tend to soften their positions, leaving Euro-skepticism to those that are peripheral to the party system. As the literature review proves, the reason why there was no decrease in the Euro-skepticism of these two parties' elites might be associated with their current political situations as peripheral parties.

A similar study that was conducted by Arikan, (2004) proves that fundamental nationalist and religious parties are in support of the EU membership project of Turkey when they are core parties. Arikan's study showed that these fundamental parties demonstrated a positive reaction to two different critical events, and both of these events possibly played a key role in increasing the overall percentage of pro-EU framings in both parties in comparison to their anti-EU framings. The results of my study are in complete opposition to that of Arikan's study. Even the number of positive statements in my study easily shows that there is no support for the EU at all. The findings of this dissertation show that the percentage of positive statements about the EU was only 0.2 percent for MHP and 0.4 percent for SP, and this can be seen from the frequency tables for "types of statements" of each party. This is a clear proof that those fundamental parties change their discourses in a negative way when they became peripheral.

The two parties, MHP and SP, might be using Turkey's EU membership as a political tool to manipulate the public opinion and become successful in future elections. These two parties also might be targeting the core parties such as AKP by

criticizing their way of handling Turkey's EU membership process. SP and MHP might believe that this can overshadow the success of the current government and give them a chance to defend themselves and influence the Turkish public against the current administration. Peripheral Parties vs. Core Parties can also be associated with SIT's In-group vs. Out-group discussion.

The third answer to why these two positive events did not decrease Euro-skepticism in these political elites can be explained by associating the findings of this study with the policy of the EU regarding Turkey. The results of this study may not be associated only with the social identity theory or with a group's status as a peripheral party. The policy requirements of the EU regarding Turkey's sensitive issues may be the real reason why there was not a positive change in the Euro-skepticism of these Parties' elites. They may have serious concerns about the future of Turkey. EU's membership requirements on some sensitive issues may have kept the Euro-skepticism at the same level or increased it in a negative way. The content analysis part of the study clarified the reasons for the Euro-skepticism of these two parties' elites. A total of 1158 statements about the EU and EU's Policy towards Turkey were found from the data that belongs to Felicity Party (SP). On the other hand, 972 statements about the EU and the EU's Policy were found from the data which belongs to the Nationalist Action Party. Most of these statements are negative. Since there is not enough space to explain all of these statements of and reasons for Euro-skepticism, I am going to give a general idea of why these political parties are skeptical about the EU and what the reasons are that worry these elites about the future of the country. The following reasons are most

nearly the main concerns of both sets of political party elites and are responsible for increased Euro-skepticism toward EU:

Cyprus Issue, (recognition of southern Cyprus, lifting the restrictions on Cyprus-flagged vessels and vessels serving the Cyprus trade),

Retrial of Abdullah Ocalan who is the leader of PKK,

Promotion of Kurdish Nationalism by the EU,

The change in electoral system (10 percent threshold and use of other languages rather than Turkish by political parties)

The changes on the Penal Code of Turkey,

Reopening of the Greek Orthodox Seminary which has been closed since 1971,

Removing the bans on public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch and the election of the heads of some religious minorities,

Recognition of some groups in Turkey as minorities such as Kurds and Alevis,

Opening of Turkey's border with Armenia,

Recognition of so-called Armenian Genocide,

Legalizing adultery,

Allowing property sales to foreigners in Turkey and Northern Cyprus,

The fear that European integration could erode national sovereignty and dilute Turkish-Islamic identity and culture possibly helped to form these two parties' skepticism toward EU integration (Arikan, 2004)

In addition to these nationalism-based and religion based concerns about the EU's policy on Turkey's domestic affairs, EU-skeptical political leaders also have

concerns about double standards of the EU toward Turkey. They believe that the EU is particularly tough on Turkey, and they suspect that whatever else Turkey accomplishes, European Union countries will not let Turkey join because of their deeply engrained prejudices. For instance, the elites of MHP are angry at the fact that the EU already admitted that Turkey's accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics (Genel Degerlendirme, 2004).

Any of these three answers above could be the reason why the favorable decisions of the EU did not decrease the Euro-skepticism of the elites of the MHP and the SP.

The difference in Parties' reaction to decisions of the European Union is also another point that requires explanation. As we observed from the hypotheses testing, the two major events, in both political parties, did not have any impact on religion-based and trust-based Euro-skepticism. On the other hand, only the first event had an impact on the nationalism-based Euro-skepticism of both political parties and overall Euro-skepticism of the MHP. This result showed that both parties had more concern about nationalism-based issues throughout the duration of first event. MHP had 127 statements before the first event and 156 after the first event. On the other hand SP had 97 statements before the first event and 75 after the first event. Both parties' EU-related negative statements increased because of the impact of the first event. This first event, December 17, 2004, have been the first indication for these peripheral parties that the

EU was not an insincere supra-national unity as these parties were announcing in front of the public. This event proved that the EU is ready to open the door for Turkey when Turkey completes the requirements. The declarations that those two peripheral parties were making about the EU were unjust. This decision from the EU also proved the success of the government and could have had an impact on the results of the following election in favor of the current government. These two parties might have wanted to overshadow the success of the government by increasing their speeches on some sensitive nationalism-based issues. This could help to turn the public's attention in different direction. As a result, I believe that the frequency of nationalism-based negative statements increased in both parties' discourses. On the other hand, the first event only affected the overall Euro-skepticism of the MHP, not the SP. This also proves that the MHP showed more skepticism compared to the SP duration of the first event.

Policy Recommendations

The discussions about Euro-skepticism have recently attracted an intense academic interest in member and, especially, in candidate countries of the European Union. The dream of becoming a United States of Europe started facing a serious threat called Euro-skepticism. Euro-skepticism started showing itself mostly in candidate countries but also in the member countries of the EU. Sir Anthony Eden's often cited comment, from one of his speeches made in 1952 at Columbia University in New York, explains British Euro-skepticism very well. " British membership of a 'federation on the

continent of Europe' was something 'we know in our bones we cannot do'" (Young, 1998, 73-74). The opposition of France and the Netherlands in ratification referenda for the proposed EU constitution showed that this dream of being a United States of Europe would not come true without problems. The EU started to realize that it is problematic to think that the European Union project can develop into the sort of federal state, advocated by "eurofederalists" such as the former German foreign minister Herr Fischer, with so many differences among the states regarding language, culture, and historical background. Turkey's possible membership will create another difference with Islam (Christie, 2007). What then may be a good plan good plan, to solve the problem and to help decrease Euro-skepticism in either the EU member or candidate countries?

I strongly believe that Christie's (2007) modern-day Madisonian approach for the EU might be a good solution to decrease Euro-skepticism. By following the same advice from Christie's Madisonian approach, I would recommend the EU to focus its future efforts on two of the primary purposes of the original American Constitution.

According to this approach, the EU should promote economic growth through trade, a common currency, and the protection of private contractual and property rights. On the other hand the EU should leave the development of social welfare, domestic, and criminal policies to the individual states.

I believe that it is too early for EU to be the "United States of Europe". As Christie indicates, the EU should not ignore that historical fact that it took a long time for 13 original American states to become the United States of America, even though

they shared the same language (English), a common language and culture influenced by that religion (Protestant Christianity), common legal principles based on English law, and a common history as people who had fought and bled together against a common enemy for independence (Christie, 2007). Even today, some issues in the US are matters of state, not federal, law. The EU has still continued to accept new members, and without giving enough time to test the harmony of all these states, it might well be a big mistake choosing the Franco-German vision of “deeper and narrower” instead of choosing the British vision of “wider and shallower.” Franco-German vision promotes the political integration of the EU as more important than expanding the free-trade zone. On the other, hand British vision promotes expanding the free-trade zone into as many countries as possible while preventing the evolution of the EU into a federal super-state. If the harmony test can be accomplished by the states, then it will be more rational to work on the vision of “deeper and narrower” (Christie, 2005)

As discussed above, if the EU leaves states free to make their own decision on some issues it will diminish Euro-skepticism, and may get the States closer to accepting the idea of Europeanization or the “United States of Europe.” This could solve the problem and decrease Euro-skepticism in member countries such as French and Denmark, and candidate countries such as Turkey.

This will also eliminate the concerns of Euro-skeptical Turkish political elites on some sensitive nationalistic and religious issues. In addition to that;

The EU also needs to help Turkey to understand the nature of the accession process better. This will also alleviate concerns about double standards of the EU toward Turkey.

The EU needs to find a strategy to built trust in Euro-skeptical Turkish people and in the elite's hearts and minds while stressing the aim of eventual Turkish membership.

The EU needs to realize that being too tough on Turkey will not solve the problem. It will only reinforce their view that the EU imposes double standards and will not admit Turkey no matter what it does.

Besides the responsibilities of the EU to Turkey, Euro-skeptical Turkish elites also have serious responsibility for a better and modern Turkey. First of all they need to realize that globalization transformed the world into a small village, and we all have some responsibilities to have peace in that village. The key to this peace is a better foreign policy. Turkey needs to be constructive. It should not be forgotten that selfishness, discrimination, anger, prejudice towards other religions and nations have no place in foreign policy (TESEV, 2006)

Recommendations for Future Research

This Study can be replicated using the same peripheral parties with a different major event and timing,

This study can be replicated with a different major event when these parties become core,

This study can be replicated on different parties with the same major events,

This study can be replicated on different parties with different major events,

This study can be replicated on the same parties when/if Turkey becomes a member of the EU,

This study can be replicated by other foreign researchers by using major events in their own countries,

This study can be replicated by other foreign researchers on some peripheral parties in their own countries,

This study can be replicated by other foreign researchers on some core or opposition parties in their own country,

Turkey is to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007, and the result of the parliamentary elections might shape the future of EU-Turkey relations. If these two peripheral parties win the election and become core parties, it will be interesting to look at their stance regarding the EU-Turkey relationship. If this study is replicated on these parties when they become core parties, and if the results come out that their skepticism decreased and they became more supportive of the EU and the EU's policy, then the findings of this study will also be consolidated.

As indicated above, this study can also be replicated on Euro-skeptical parties by taking the day of Turkey's becoming an EU member as a major event. It is going to be very interesting to see how the Euro-skeptical parties will be affected by that event and how they will react to the EU.

Limitations of this Study:

For the purpose of this study the following two limitations were recognized:

-The main limitation of the study is its focus on only available data on certain types of newspapers such as mainstream Milliyet, Pro-SP Milli Gazete and Pro-MHP Ortadogu.

-Besides the direct statements of these political elites, there were some indirect statements that were paraphrased by the news reporter. Even though the sentences were coming from the political elite, there is always a risk that these paraphrased statements might have included the perception of the reporter, and there is no way for the researcher to confirm the accuracy without seeing the original (direct) statement.

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APPENDIX A

The List of the Political Party Elites who are the sample of this study;

MHP

Chairman; Devlet Bahçeli

Council of Chairmanship

Chairman; Devlet Bahçeli

Secretary-General; M. Cihan Pacacı

Assistant Chairman of the Party; Ali Isiklar

Assistant Chairman of the Party; Atila Kaya

Assistant Chairman of the Party; Faruk Bal

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Mehmet Ekici

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Mehmet Sandir

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Metin Cobanoğlu,

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Murat Sefkatli

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Oktay Vural

Assistant Chairman of the Party, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu

Assistant Secretary-General; Bulent Didinmez

Assistant Secretary-General; Mehmet Nacar

Assistant Secretary-General; Recai Yildirim

Chief Accountant; Umit Safak

Assistant Chief Accountant; Mihrali Aksu

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/partimiz/bskdivan.php>

General Executive Committee

Abbas Bozyel

Abdulkadir Akcan

Abdurrahman Kucuk

Abdul Mirmahmutogullari

Ahmet Bukan

Ahmet Icyer

Ahmet Kenan Tanrikulu

Ahmet Vural

Ali Gebes

Ali Isiklar

Ali Ozdemir

Ali Torlak

Ali Uzunirmak

Altay Tokat

Ismet Buyukataman

Kursat Eser

M. Cihan Pacaci

Mehmet Ekici

Mehmet Nacar

Mehmet Pak

Mehmet Sandir

Mehmet Taytak

Mehmet Telek

Meral Aksener

Metin Cobanoglu

Mihrali Aksu

Murat Sefkatli

Mustafa Onoz

Atila Kaya

Atilla Dorum

Bekir Aksoy

Bulent Didinmez

Cemal Akin

Cengiz Aldemir

Cezmi Polat

Cumali Durmus

Ercument Konukman

Ertugrul Kumcuoglu

Faruk Bal

Hamdi Baktir

Hanefi Celik

Hasan Ali Turkaslan

Hidayet Kilinc

I.Engin Tokdemir

Ismail Hakki Cerrahoglu

Ismail Hakki Kupcu

Ismail Kose

Ismail Ozkarakaya

Mustafa Mit

Mustafa Zorlu

Muzaffer Cakmakli

Munir Kutluata

Namik Kemal Zeybek

Oktay Vural

Osman Cakir

Osman Durmus

Omer Izgi

Ozcan Yaniceri

Ramazan Mirzaoglu

Recai Yildirim

Resat Dogru

S. Turan Cirkin

Sabahattin Cakmakoglu

Suat Basaran

Saban Kardes

Suayip Usenmez

Tunca Toskay

Turkmen Onur

Umit Safak

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/partimiz/myk.php>

High Discipline Committee

Vahit Kayrici

Erdem Senocak

Naci Buyukcelebi

Adnan Fatin Ozdemir

Halil Harman

Ilhami Yilmaz

Ahmet Sari

Omer Ali Beyazit

Abdullah Kus

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/partimiz/mdk.php>

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/> (Official Web Page of MHP)

SP

Chairman; Recai Kutan

Council of Chairmanship

Lutfu Esengun

Prof. Dr. Numan Kurtulmus

Temel Karamollaoglu

Dr. Ahmet Sunnetcioglu

Teoman Riza Guneri

Av. Sevket Kazan

Mustafa Ozkafa

Dr. Ertan Yulek

Cevat Ayhan

Doc. Dr. Mete Gundogan

Omer Vehbi Hatiboglu

Suat Pamukcu

Mustafa Gecer

Av. Seref Kolcak

Husamettin Korkutata

<http://www.sp.org.tr/sayfa.asp?id=29>

General Executive Committee

Av. Abdulhamid Gul

Dr. Mehmet Sunnetcioglu

Ahmet Demircan

Av. Ahmet Tekdal

Ahmet Cemil Tunc

Prof Dr. Arif Ersoy

Atik Agdag

Aysenur Tekdal

Bahri Zengin

Mucahit Yanilmaz

Musa Demirci

Mustafa Ozkafa

Mustafa Gecer

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kamalak

Niyazi Yanmaz

Pr. Dr. Numan Kurtulmus

Oguzhan Asilturk

Omer Vehbi Hatipoglu

Cafer Gunes

Cevat Ayhan

Dr. Ertan Yulek

Fehim Adak

Fetullah Erbas

Hayrettin Dilekcan

Hilmi Tanis

Husamettin Korkutata

Av. Ismail Muftuoglu

Prof. Dr. Latif Oztek

Lutfi Yalman

Lutfu Kibiroglu

Lutfu Esengun

Mehmet Bozgeyik

Mehmet Batuk

Mehmet Karaman

Doc. Dr. Mete Gundogan

<http://www.sp.org.tr/sayfa.asp?id=28>

Osman Yumakogullari

Doc. Dr. Oya M. Akgonenc

Recai Kutan

Sacit Gunbey

Serafettin Kilic

Av. Seref Malkoc

Av. Sevket Kazan

Suat Pamukcu

Temel Karamollaoglu

Teoman Riza Guneri

Dr. Turhan Alcelik

Veysel Candan

Yakup Budak

Yasar Canbay

Av. Yasin Hatipoglu

Zeki Celik

Zulfikar Gazi

High Discipline Committee

Abdulkadir Oncel

Ali Guneri

Musa Okcu

Nezir Aydin

Enver Bakirci

Omer Faruk Ekinici

Huseyin Celebican

Riza Ulucak

Av. Ismail Aydos

Yahya Incetahtaci

Av. Mehmet Ener

<http://www.sp.org.tr/sayfa.asp?id=30>

<http://www.sp.org.tr/> (Official Web Page of SP)

APPENDIX B

Presidency Conclusions:

- “The European Council recalled its previous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, at Helsinki, it agreed that Turkey was a Candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States and, subsequently, concluded that, if it were to decide at its December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

-The European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform. Furthermore, it expects Turkey to actively pursue its efforts to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission. To ensure the irreversibility of the political reform process and its full, effective and comprehensive implementation, notably with regard to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights, that process will continue

to be closely monitored by the Commission, which is invited to continue to report regularly on it to the Council, including the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy relating to torture and ill-treatment. The European Union will continue to monitor closely progress of the political reform on the basis of an Accession Partnership setting out priorities for the reform process.

- The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States. In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that "the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union".

-The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbors and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of

Helsinki on this matter, the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate.

-The European Council noted the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2004.

-The European Council welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission. It decided that, in the light of the above and of the Commission report recommendation, Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations provided that it brings into force these specific pieces of legislation.

It invited the Commission to present to the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey, on the basis set out in paragraph twenty three. It requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005” (Brussels, 2005).

APPENDIX C

General Framework for negotiations:

-“As in previous negotiations, the substance of the negotiations, which will be conducted in an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of all Member States on the one hand and the candidate State concerned on the other, where decisions require unanimity, will be broken down into a number of chapters, each covering a specific policy area. The Council, by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission, will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening each chapter; depending on the chapter concerned, these benchmarks will refer to legislative alignment and a satisfactory track record of implementation of the *acquis* as well as obligations deriving from contractual relations with European Union.

-Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals for each framework, for areas such as freedom of movement of persons structural

policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market.

-The financial aspects of accession of a candidate State must be allowed for in the applicable Financial Framework. Hence, accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose accession could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms.

-The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.

-In the case of serious breach in a candidate State of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for their resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard the Candidate State, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The member state will act in the IGC in accordance with the Council decision, without prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in the IGC. The European Parliament will be informed.

-Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with every Candidate State in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. With the aim of enhancing mutual understanding by bringing people together, this inclusive dialogue also will involve civil society” (Brussels, 2005).

Framework for Negotiations about Turkey’s membership:

-“The underlying and shared objective of the talks will be Turkey’s accession. However, the negotiations will be “open-ended”, which means that their outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.

-At the end of the talks, should Turkey fail to qualify in full for all obligations of EU member states would still ensure that Ankara is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.

-The accession negotiations will be conducted in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The policy issues will be broken down into 35 policy areas (chapters) – more than ever before – and the decisions will require unanimity.

- The EU may consider the inclusion of long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposals for each framework.

-Membership talks with candidates “whose accession could have substantial financial consequences” (such as Turkey) can only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled date for the establishment of the EU’s new financial framework.

-Accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a “serious and persistent breach [...] of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. Suspension would require a Commission initiative or a request to that effect by one third of the member states. The final

decision would be made by the Council by qualified majority, and the European Parliament would be informed.

-Under a compromise formula agreed at the December 2004 EU Council, before 3 October 2005 Turkey would have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the ten new member states of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government. For practical purposes this would amount to an implicit recognition of this government for the first time government for the first time since the Island division in 1974. “The adoption of this protocol is in no way recognition, and I’ve put this on the record,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said. The deal did not include a commitment from Ankara that the protocol would be ratified by the Turkish parliament before October 2005. As for the other key condition: Turkey on 1 June 2005 enacted the country’s revised penal code” (Framework for Negotiations about Turkey’s Membership).(<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmmuri=tcm:29-129678-16&type=LinksDossier>)

APPENDIX D

CODING OF 50 RANDOMLY SELECTED STATEMENTS

Number of Statements	RESEARCHER	CODER1	CODER2
1	2	2	2
2	4	4	4
3	1	1	1
4	2	2	2
5	2	2	2
6	2	2	2
7	2	2	2
8	5	5	5
9	4	4	4
10	2	2	2
11	4	4	4
12	4	4	4
13	7	7	5
14	1	1	1
15	1	1	1

16	4	4	4
17	4	4	4
18	7	7	4
19	2	2	2
20	1	1	1
21	4	4	4
22	2	2	2
23	1	1	1
24	2	2	2
25	2	2	2
26	2	2	2
27	4	5	4
28	7	7	7
29	2	2	2
30	5	4	5
31	7	4	5
32	2	2	2
33	1	1	1
34	5	4	5
35	2	2	2
36	4	4	4
37	2	2	2

38	2	2	2
39	3	3	3
40	4	4	4
41	7	7	7
42	4	4	4
43	2	2	2
44	2	4	4
45	2	2	2
46	2	2	2
47	7	7	7
48	7	7	7
49	2	2	4
50	3	3	3